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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Consider the following case. In 1987 India intervened in Sri Lanka with a force 
that eventually numbered forty-five thousand troops (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 
125). The intervention was a direct consequence of civil conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Violence between minority Tamil separatists and the majority Sinhalese had 
escalated since 1983. When the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – LTTE 
announced that they take over the civilian administration of the majority Tamil 
Jaffna Peninsula, and the Sri Lankan government launched a blockade and 
offensive with a heavy civilian toll, India was compelled to intervene (Cooper & 
Berdal 1993: 123). Among the causes that led India to commit to an intervention 
with an estimated cost of $150 million and at least a thousand fallen soldiers 
(Cooper & Berdal 1993: 125), central mechanisms were directly set in motion by 
transnational ethnic affinities. 
The mobilisation of Indian Tamil sympathy for the plight of their ethnic 
brethren revived official fears of Indian Tamil secessionism (Ganguly 1998: 205). 
Affinity between the Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils across the 
strait in Sri Lanka stemmed from shared ethnic identity, language, and cultural 
traits (Ganguly 1998: 204). New Delhi was under immense pressure from its own 
outraged 50 million-strong Tamil population and their leadership to relieve the 
suffering of the Sri Lankan Tamils (ibid.). Ethnic affinities thus created 
conditions that forced New Delhi’s hand. The Indian government feared that 
inaction would provoke Tamil nationalists to demand the secession of Tamil 
Nadu into an independent Dravidastan, a separatist movement for which their 
were deep historical roots (Ganguly 1998: 205). The transnational dimension of 
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the Tamil ethnic issue raised a catalogue of additional internal security issues 
(Cooper & Berdal 1993: 123).  
Transnational ethnic affinities were thus a central factor in setting in 
motion mechanisms that led to Indian intervention in the Tamil-Sinhalese 
conflict. Even though New Delhi responded to Indian Tamil demands, India could 
not accept a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Not only was the situation 
reminiscent of the prelude to an earlier partition of India; New Delhi could not be 
seen to contradict its rejection of nation-building based on ethnic, linguistic or 
religious identity in an intervention abroad when it repressed similar 
secessionist movements at home (Ganguly 1998: 209). Thus, while India was no 
friend of the Sri Lankan government, the intervention was in favour of some 
incarnation of the status quo, with at best some autonomy for the Sri Lankan 
Tamils (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 125). Being as it was intended, amongst others, to 
quell Tamil separatism, the Indian intervention may go down as having been 
implicitly supportive of the Sri Lankan government.  
The case of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka may be seen as an example 
of  a third-party intervention in civil conflict - a broader class of phenomena to 
which a range of scholarship is devoted to studying (such as Aydin 2005; 
Carment & James 2000; Cooper & Berdal 1993; Ganguly 1998; Gleditsch & 
Beardsley 2004; Heraclides 1990; Lemke & Regan 2004; Pearson 1974; Pickering 
2002; Regan 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002; Walter 2002), and of which this study 
attempts to add some understanding. For, more specifically, the Indian 
intervention in Sri Lanka was a third-party intervention in a civil conflict caused 
by mechanisms set in motion by transnational ethnic affinities. At issue is 
whether ethnic affinities may be mapped on to a wider set of interventions in 
internal conflicts. By statistically modelling data on civil conflicts in North 
Africa, Europe and Asia since 1944, I seek to test whether and how transnational 
ethnic affinities and the ethnic characteristics of intervener and target affect the 
likelihood of interventions and their partiality. Do transnational ethnic affinities 
increase the probability of interventions? Does the relative predominance of one 
ethnic group in potential interveners turn them into actual interveners? May 
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variation in the configuration of ethnic groups and power explain which side 
interventions favour? Those are the questions I attempt to answer.  
I adopt Regan’s (2000: 10) definition of third-party interventions in internal 
conflicts as ‘convention-breaking military and / or economic activities in the 
internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the 
government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the 
government and opposition forces.’ I only address interventions by states. When 
several states intervened in a civil conflict I consider them as separate unilateral 
interventions.1 I also use Regan’s (2000: 21) definition of civil conflict as ‘armed 
combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 
fatalities’, intended to capture the seriousness of a conflict, yet to exclude events 
like ‘bloodless’ coups, riots or demonstrations. Throughout the text, various 
combinations of ‘civil’ / ‘internal’ and ‘conflict’ / ‘war’ all refer to the same 
phenomenon.  
Transnational ethnic affinities are somewhat more elusive. I assume, not 
unlike Davis & Moore (1997: 173), that members of an ethnic group have 
empathy and sympathy with others identified as being members of the same 
ethnic group on issues that are salient to their ethnicity. I also assume that 
affinity extends to groups that are not ethnically alike, but that evoke some sort 
of identification based on ethnic identity. Thus one form of ethnic affinities is 
that experienced by for instance Tamils for other Tamils, and another form of 
ethnic or identity-based affinities are those felt by for example African 
Americans for the South Sudanese. Such empathy and sympathy must have a 
potential for political mobilisation if ethnic affinities are to be influential on 
foreign policy outcomes. Political mobilisation is evident in both the case of the 
Indian Tamils, and African Americans’ sympathy for black Sudanese as it is 
expressed through lobbying the U.S. government (Perry 2004; Smith 2005) or 
through organisations like Africa Action, The American Anti-Slavery Group, and 
the Coalition Against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan.2 I propose that 
transnational ethnic affinities be theoretically defined, then, as empathy and 
                                                 
1 I deal with the concomitant dependency problems in section 3.2. 
2 http://www.africaaction.org; http://www.iabolish.com; http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/. 
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sympathy with an ethnic group in a foreign country, identified as being 
ethnically alike or relevant by virtue of ethnic identification, with a potential for 
political mobilisation.  
Besides anecdotal knowledge of cases such as the Indian intervention in Sri 
Lanka, there is both a theoretical and an empirical rationale for studying the 
effects of ethnic affinities on interventions. Theoretically, Mitchell’s (1970: 184) 
conceptual distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘affective’ linkages between 
groups in the civil war state and the potential intervener has been formative, 
and resonates somewhat in Suhrke & Noble (1977: 10) and Heraclides (1990: 
370). By suggesting that affective linkages, relative to transactional linkages, 
may be ‘more significant in any attempt to understand those linkages resulting 
in intervention in internal conflict’, and by explicitly listing linkages that may be 
loosely categorised as ethnic, Mitchell (1970: 185) suggests a very clear 
conceptual direction for the study of third-party interventions, and adds 
legitimacy to the investigation of ethnic affinities as an explanatory variable. 
Beyond Mitchell (1970), Suhrke & Noble (1977) and Heraclides (1990), there is 
no shortage of references to the possible salience of transnational ethnic 
affinities to interstate relations (Carment & James 1997: 2; Chazan 1991: 7; 
Ellingsen 2000: 243; Regan 1998: 758; van Evera 1994: 12, amongst others).  
Empirically, anecdotal studies by Heraclides (1990) and Cooper & Berdal 
(1993), comparative case studies such as Carment & James (2000) and Ganguly 
(1998), and quantitative work like Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997) and 
Saideman (2002), provide evidence that affective factors and ethnicity variables 
really do influence interstate relations, intervention, and war. Simultaneously, 
they leave space for further theoretical specification and empirical application, to 
which this study has some pretensions.   
Given my set of definitions, the findings suggest that transnational ethnic 
affinities, as they have been operationalised, have a robust and sizeable effect on 
the likelihood of interventions in civil conflicts. States are more likely to 
intervene when they contain ethnic groups with affinity for an ethnic group in 
the civil war state than when they do not, ceteris paribus. The results also 
suggest that states in which the ethnic group in power is relatively predominant 
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are more likely to become interveners than states with greater ethnic pluralism. 
Finally, hypotheses about how the side of interventions is determined by 
configurations of ethnic groups and power, receive tentative, if inconclusive 
support. I use the terms ‘side of intervention’ or ‘intervention side’ to refer to 
which party in civil conflicts interventions favour - government or opposition.    
The text is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
develops an analytical framework for the empirical study of ethnically motivated 
third-party interventions in internal conflicts. It does so by assembling a formal 
model of the choice to intervene, and by specifying alternative configurations of 
ethnic groups and power that determine the mechanisms by which ethnic 
affinities are translated into interventions. Chapter 3 presents the statistical 
model, the data, the variables and their operationalisation, subsequent to some 
epistemological and methodological introspection. Chapter 4 reports the results 
from the statistical analyses with some preliminary comments. Chapter 5 
discusses the two central projects in this thesis: the empirical findings and their 
potential for inference, and the theoretical advance represented by the analytical 
framework. Critical light is also shed on the inquiry, particularly in terms of 
measurement validity and theoretical limitations. Chapter 6 summarises the 
findings, proposes steps for further research, and thereby concludes this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
2 
THE ETHNIC DIMENSION OF  
THE CHOICE TO INTERVENE 
 
This chapter develops an analytical framework for the inquiry. I introduce it by 
arguing for a dyadic approach to analysis. Then I suggest a set of expected utility 
functions and a contest success function as means to formalise the choice to 
intervene. Following that, I discuss the central distinction between dyads 
containing transnational ethnic affinities - ethnically biased dyads - and dyads 
containing no such affinities. More particularly, I present a four-fold typology of 
ethnically biased dyads, defined by how ethnic groups are placed with regard to 
power, and I structure the review of earlier literature according to this typology. 
I focus on how the different types of dyad are expected to be associated with 
variation in the likelihood and side of interventions. In closing, I summarise the 
discussion by presenting a set of hypotheses for empirical testing. 
 
2.1          A DYADIC APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
 
The investigation owes much to earlier theoretical work (Kasfir 1979; Mitchell 
1970; Suhrke & Noble 1977) that has contributed to the analytical organisation 
of later empirical research (Carment & James 2000 and Regan 1998 come to 
mind). Mitchell (1970), in particular, will provide the point of departure for the 
following argument.  
Mitchell’s (1970) conceptual framework for the empirical study of third-
party interventions in internal conflict is a useful contribution to ways of 
 12
approaching the matter. He is early to identify the categories of variables that 
ought to be investigated: ‘factors within the “disrupted” state’ and ‘factors within 
the intervening state’, ‘factors associated with the links [between the civil war 
country and the potential intervener]’, and ‘factors in the international system’ 
(Mitchell 1970: 170). Mitchell thus presents a comprehensive set of variable 
categories that encompass the determinants of relations between two states, and 
which I refer to as ‘monadic’, ‘dyadic’, and ‘systemic’. Monadic variables are those 
associated exclusively with single states, such as characteristics of its internal 
conflict, its economic size, and so on. Dyadic variables are the characteristics of a 
pair of states, for instance the ratio of power between them, or transnational 
relations between ethnic groups. Systemic factors pertain to the entire 
international system of states.  
On the one hand, Mitchell (1970) provides a useful way in which to organise 
causal mechanisms. Although systemic factors will be included in the control 
variables to be presented in the following section, the focus here will be on the 
monadic and the dyadic. Ethnic affinities and the mechanisms that link them to 
third-party interventions may, after all, best be fitted in monadic and dyadic 
frameworks, as opposed to systemic.  
On the other hand, Mitchell’s (1970: 170) categories provide alternative 
ways of organising data. Past quantitative studies of interventions have opted for 
both monadic and dyadic data designs. Whereas work from some years back have 
monadic data designs (such as Pickering 2002: 302; Regan 1998: 768; Saideman 
2002: 33), some of the most recent contributions choose dyadic approaches (Aydin 
2005: 13; Lemke & Regan 2004: 155). Some have employed a monadic rather 
than a dyadic data design partly as a pragmatic response to theoretically 
founded difficulties of case selection.  
Take Regan (1998) for example. Instead of framing the question in dyadic 
terms, asking why some pairs of countries experience intervention when others 
do not, he frames the question monadically, using the internal conflict as the 
unit of analysis, and asks why some internal conflicts attract interventions as 
opposed to others (Regan 1998: 768). The monadic approach, he argues, ‘is 
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ultimately borne of the difficulty of identifying all relevant dyads, including 
those that may have considered intervening but chose not to.’ (Regan 1998: 768) 
This must be solved in any dyadic analysis, for underlying Regan’s (1998: 768) 
argument is the sense that the study of pairs of states is to be preferred. One 
monadic contribution is very clear on this point, suggesting that dyadic research 
is the way of the future ‘because the ethnic ties argument focuses on the 
relationship between the domestic politics in one country and the combatants in 
ethnic conflict elsewhere’ (Saideman 2002: 46). Subsequently, dyadic data 
designs have been adopted by both Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) and Aydin (2005: 
13), and the question of relevant dyads has been solved by treating all states as 
potential interveners, and by including determinants of opportunity in the 
statistical model (Lemke & Regan 2004: 155).  
Whereas I will discuss the question of opportunity versus willingness in the 
section on control variables in Chapter 3, I argue here that a dyadic data design 
has a conceptual appeal that makes efforts to find a solution to the question of 
dyadic relevance worthwhile. As Saideman (2002: 46) recognises, intervention by 
one state into the internal affairs of another must necessarily be a function of 
relational characteristics. When transnational loyalties of some sort or another 
generate foreign policy outcomes directed at the other state in a dyad, those 
transnational loyalties are necessarily a characteristic of the pair of states as one 
analytical unit. The same could be said for other interstate transactions and 
flows of goods, services, people and money. Consequently, I choose a dyadic 
approach to the analysis of third-party interventions in internal conflicts.  
The question, then, is how dyads in which interventions occur differ from 
dyads with no intervention. Given my preoccupation with ethnic affinities, the 
question is more precisely how intradyadic transnational ethnic ties affect the 
likelihood and side of interventions. My unit of observation, in short, is the 
interstate dyad, within which affective factors such as ethnic affinities are 
presumed to influence the likelihood of intervention. The task for this chapter, 
among other things, is to reflect on how affective factors may fit in a rational 
process of foreign policy-making. To that end, I employ decision theory. 
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2.2          THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INTERVENTION 
 
Decision theory assumes for analytical purposes that actors’ behaviour conforms 
to the expectations of rational choice. It assumes that decisions are 
instrumentally rational. Given a set of interests – staying in power, national 
security, advancing or protecting one’s ethnic kin, et cetera – actors weigh 
alternatives against each other by comparing the known and expected costs and 
benefits of each alternative, choosing the one with the greatest expected utility. 
An expected utility framework is analytically useful because it identifies a set of 
terms more general than specific variables, the variation in which determine the 
likelihood of intervention.  
Before proceeding to consider the ins and outs of my particular function, it 
is worth questioning whether an expected utility framework is appropriate for 
modelling the choice to intervene. The expected utility function concerns itself 
solely with the decision-making process in the potential intervener. Do I 
intervene or do I not? Such a decision-theoretic approach assumes that the 
potential intervener regards the target state as if it was nature, that is, as if the 
outcome of various intervention strategies was independent of the target state’s 
possible responses to intervention. In other words, the probabilities of the 
possible outcomes of intervention are assumed to be exogenous, and are treated 
as constant in the models below. Arguably, this may not be the case. One could 
maintain that the target of intervention is best understood as a rational 
opponent, and that the probabilities of alternative intervention outcomes are 
contingent on the target state’s response to intervention. If so, then decision 
theory may not be appropriate. As Tsebelis (1989: 77) argues, ‘the expected utility 
calculations typically used in decision theory are inappropriate when 
probabilities are not exogenous but part of the (equilibrium) strategy of a rational 
opponent.’ The question here, then, is not whether it is reasonable to expect 
variation in a target state’s response to intervention. To some extent it clearly is. 
The question, rather, is whether it is reasonable to assume that the potential 
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intervener pays little regard to the possible reactions of the target when it weighs 
the pros and cons of intervention. Regan (1998: 759) evidently thinks it is. 
Referring to the 1994 French intervention in Rwanda and the 1997 Nigerian 
intervention in Sierra Leone, he argues that the potential responses of the Hutu 
leadership and Sierra Leone respectively, had little bearing on the French and 
Nigerian decisions to intervene (Regan 1998: 759-760). Those decisions, Regan 
(1998: 759-760) maintains, were the results of internal processes in the 
intervening states. The argument is plausible, particularly if one considers that 
France is a great power and Nigeria a regional power, at least with regard to 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone. What detracts from the argument is its basis in 
anecdotal evidence. One could just as easily find anecdotes in favour of strategic 
interaction, such as Arab states considering to intervene in Israel with the 
knowledge that behind stands a mighty United States. I accept Regan’s 
argument as a reasonable generalisation, however, noting that great powers and 
regional powers are the most prevalent interveners (Tillema 1989: 184). At any 
rate, an expected utility framework offers such gains in terms of parsimony with 
regard to a model of strategic interaction, and analytical clarity relative to no 
model, that I choose to proceed with it, knowing its limitations, but emphasising 
its possibilities. In the following, my reasoning is influenced by Regan (1998: 759-
762).  
Internal conflicts have international character. So have many gone far to 
demonstrate, for example Modelski (1964), Rosenau (1964), Stedman (1996), 
Marshall (1997), and Stack Jr. (1997). Other states will have a stake in how 
internal conflicts evolve. For the states that feel concerned, internal conflicts 
offer opportunities to intervene, for which either alternative must be regarded as 
an active policy choice: to intervene or not to intervene. Associated with any 
choice is a set of costs. There will be material costs, such as the costs of mounting 
a military expedition. There will be human costs, such as casualties from war, 
displaced populations, or the persecution of ethnic kin. Significantly, there will 
also be audience costs. Audience costs capture the public aspect of the conduct of 
foreign policy, the fact that responses to civil conflicts abroad have political 
audiences that evaluate the skill and performance of their leaders (Fearon 1994: 
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580).  Audience costs are the loss of support from whatever constituency opposes 
either choice of policy, be it among the masses or within the political elites 
(Fearon 1994: 581). Every category of costs will be part of a cost-benefit 
calculation, so that the cost function may be expressed as 
 
∑ ∑ ∑++= audiencehumanmaterial CCCC  
 
For the purposes of the expected utility functions, I express the costs somewhat 
differently. The costs of intervention are  
 
η
i
EA
ii CCC += ,  , 0≤EAiC
 
expressed as the sum of the costs of intervention incurred by ethnic affinities, 
EA, and the costs of intervention incurred by some other set of stochastic factors, 
η . Note that the costs of intervention are assumed to be higher if ethnic affinities 
are not present. When a state intervenes, the costs of non-intervention are per 
definition zero, 0≡niC . One may interject that a public opinion which pushes for 
intervention in reality raises the costs of non-intervention, and that therefore a 
term for the costs of non-intervention should be defined. However, all changes in 
costs are expressed in , regardless of mechanism. If ethnic affinities lead to 
public pressure for intervention, then it translates directly into a reduction of 
.    
iC
EA
iC
So much for the costs. Integral to the rational decision is also the 
consideration of a set of utilities. I assume that an internal conflict may have two 
possible outcomes, government success or rebel success. The potential intervener 
may associate either outcome with a certain utility. Let the utility to the 
potential intervener of government success in the civil war state be expressed as  
 
η
G
EA
GG UUU += , 
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where the utility of government success is the sum of the utility provided by 
ethnic affinities, EA, and the utility determined by an unknown set of factors, η . 
Similarly, the utility of rebel success is  
 
η
R
EA
RR UUU += . 
 
The inclusion of an EA term in both the cost function and the utility 
functions is necessary because they refer to different ways in which ethnic 
affinities affect the choice to intervene. The reduction in costs due to ethnic 
affinities are mainly associated with mass pressure for intervention, or public 
acquiescence to intervention. Such costs are an aspect of domestic politics. They 
also have a temporal dimension. I assume that a reduction in audience costs 
results from the choice to intervene, not the eventual outcome of intervention. 
The utilities derived from government or rebel success, however, are estimations 
of rewards further down the timeline. Also, such utilities are aspects of 
international politics. Utilities provided by ethnic affinities are the positive 
returns to decision-makers of foreign policy success in aligning or realigning 
ethnic groups according to the foreign policy elite’s preferences.    
When deciding whether to opt for non-intervention or intervention, states 
also estimate the likelihood of the various outcomes, weighing the different 
utilities with their respective probabilities. States choose by comparing the 
expected utility of non-intervention with the expected utility of intervention. The 
decision may accordingly be modelled with two separate but concurrent utility 
functions: 
 
( ) RGni Uq1qUEU −+=  
 
and 
 
( ) iRGi CUp1pUEU −−+= , 
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 where EUni is the expected utility of not intervening, q is the estimated 
probability of government success without an intervention, EUi is the expected 
utility of intervening, and p is the estimated probability of government success 
with an intervention. Now, substitute the cost and utility functions into the 
expected utility equations. Then,  
 
( ) ( )( )ηREARηGEAGni UUq1UUqEU +−++=           (1) 
 
and 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )ηiEAiηREARηGEAGi CCUUp1UUpEU +−+−++= .          (2) 
 
In general terms, intervention will occur if EUi > EUni . I substitute 
equations (1) and (2) into EUi  > EUni  and solve for costs to get expression (3). 
Then, intervention is expected to occur when  
 
( ) ( )( )ηREARηGEAGηiEAi UUUUqpCC +−+−<+ .          (3) 
 
The right hand side of expression (3) will always be positive. If the 
intervener favours government success in the civil conflict, then 
( )( ) 0>+−+ ηREARηGEAG UUUU . It logically follows that ( ) 0>q-p , for, when the 
intervener supports the government, its probability of success p must by 
definition be greater than its probability of success q with no intervention. If the 
intervener favours rebel success, then ( )( ) 0<+−+ ηREARηGEAG UUUU . With 
intervention in support of the rebels, the difference between p and q is likewise 
because intervention reduces the probability of government success, p. 
For simplicity I rewrite the utilities term as 
( ) 0<q-p
( ) ( )ηRηGEAREAG UUUU −+− , which 
expresses RG UU −  as the sum of two differences, that accounted for by ethnic 
affinities and that determined by all other factors. I represent 
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( ) ( )ηRηGEAREAG UUUU −+−  by denoting it ηEA WW + . Then, ( ) 0>+ ηEA WW  if the 
intervener favours the government, and ( ) 0<+ ηEA WW  if the intervener favours 
the rebels. 
In order to analyse the conditions under which interventions occur, I 
consider three special cases of the general expression (3). First, transnational 
ethnic affinities may determine that the potential intervener, I, favours the 
government in the target state, T. Second, ethnic affinities may compel I to 
favour the rebels in T. Third, no ethnic affinities are present, and the side of 
intervention is not specified.  
When the potential intervener favours the government, intervention occurs 
when 
 
( )( )ηEAηiEAi WWqpCC +−<+ ,          ( ) 0>+ ηEA WW  and ( ) 0>q-p .          (4) 
 
Anything that decreases the value of the left hand side of the expression, ceteris 
paribus, raises the likelihood of intervention. The presence of ethnic affinities, for 
example, decreases the costs of intervention (recall that ), thus lowering 
the value of the left side of the expression. Conversely, anything that increases 
the value of the right hand side of the expression, ceteris paribus, make 
interventions more likely. Thus, intervention is more likely to occur as the 
probability of government success with an intervention increases and as the 
probability of government success without an intervention decreases. A greater 
sum of differences between the utility of government and rebel success make 
interventions more likely, to which ethnic affinities contribute.  
0<EAiC
When the potential intervener favours the rebels, intervention occurs when 
 
( )( )ηEAηiEAi WWqpCC +−<+ ,          ( ) 0<+ ηEA WW  and ( ) 0<q-p .          (5) 
 
Again, any decrease in the value of the left hand side of the expression, ceteris 
paribus, makes intervention more likely, as does any increase in the value of the 
right hand side, ceteris paribus. Since the potential intervener favours the rebels 
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in this case, the dynamics of the probability and utility terms have changed. 
Here, the estimated probability of government success with an intervention, p, 
must be lower than the probability of government success without an 
intervention, q. This is expected, given that intervention in this case is on the 
side of the rebels. Hence, intervention becomes more likely as q increases and as 
p decreases. Utility for the intervener lies in rebel success, and as the sum of 
differences between the utility of government and rebel success sinks further 
below zero, particularly with the contribution of ethnic affinities, intervention 
becomes more likely. 
When no ethnic affinities are present, I leave the side of interventions 
unspecified. The EA terms in the expected utility expressions are excluded, and 
the difference between utilities expressed in its general form, so that I intervenes 
in T when 
 
( )( )ηRηGηi UUqpC −−< .          (6) 
 
The major feature of this expression is the absence of ethnic affinities. Contrast 
with expression (3). Contemplate how ethnic affinities are conceived to affect the 
expected utilities of alternative actions. On every side of expression (3) is ethnic 
affinity an amplifying factor. Suppose that the potential intervener favours the 
government. Then ethnic affinities increase the utility of government success. 
Remove ethnic affinities, as I here have done, and the utility from favourable 
outcomes will look blander, and the costs of intervention will appreciate. Ethnic 
affinities, in other words, make interventions more likely. 
The question then arises how one determines where the potential 
intervener’s sympathies lie. The answer may be derived from the expected utility 
framework’s binary distinction between government and rebels in the civil war 
state. I adopt a somewhat analogous categorisation, that is Cederman & 
Girardin’s (2005: 6, 8) distinction between ‘ethnic groups in power’ (EGIP) and 
‘non-governmental ethnic groups’ (NGEG). An ethnic group is in power if its 
‘leaders serve (at least intermittently) in senior governmental positions, 
especially within the cabinet’, or when specific institutional arrangements 
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indicate power inclusion (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 7). The EGIP / NGEG 
distinction is useful because it captures the dynamics of collective action in ethnic 
conflict. Empirical tests lend it support (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 5, 10). The 
binary disaggregation of states implied by the expected utility functions and the 
EGIP / NGEG distinction may be combined to produce a world of states 
containing only two ethnic groups, one of which is in power, and one of which is 
not. Recall that the unit of analysis is the interstate dyad. Then one deals with 
the interaction of four ethnic groups. Suppose that transnational ethnic affinities 
run between one ethnic group in each country. Given that one country is a civil 
war state, T, and the other a potential intervener, I, then four types of dyad 
containing ethnic affinities emerge. I will argue in section 2.4 that the type of 
dyad determines whether the potential intervener favours the government or the 
rebels. For example, as illustrated in Table 2.1, if the EGIP in I has affinity with 
the EGIP in T, then I is expected to favour the government in T. Cells 1 and 3  
 
Table 2.1: Four dyads with ethnic affinities defined by group affiliation; two sides 
of intervention. 
 
 State I
EGIP             NGEG 
 
3
1
4
I favours  
rebels 
2
I favours  
rebels 
I favours 
gov. 
I favours 
gov. 
 
State T 
EGIP 
 
 
 
 
NGEG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
indicate the circumstances under which ( ) 0>+ ηEA WW : ethnic affinities run 
between ethnic groups in power or non-governmental ethnic groups in both 
countries. Cells 2 and 4 illustrate the contingencies in which an ethnic group in 
 22
power has affinity for a non-governmental group in the other country, in which 
case it is expected that ( ) 0<+ ηEA WW . 
A fifth type of dyad is of course the pair of states with no transnational 
ethnic affinities. In such dyads I leave the side of interventions unspecified. 
Section 2.4 on configurations of ethnicity and power is devoted to analysing the 
dyad typology.  
 
2.3          A CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION OF p AND q 
 
Interventions are, according to the expected utility approach, contingent on three 
sorts of variables: costs, utilities, and probabilities. Variation in the utilities and 
costs of intervention will be addressed in the discussion of the dyad typology. 
That leaves the probabilities for more thorough treatment. Below, I suggest that 
states’ estimation of qp −  may be modelled with a contest success function. I 
approach the question by assuming temporarily that the potential intervener 
favours the government in the target state.  
The outcome of any struggle may be considered as a function of the 
commitment of forces on each side (Hirshleifer 2000: 773). Every party to a 
conflict controls a fixed amount of resources at any point in time, of which a 
greater or lesser proportion may be channelled into fighting effort (Hirshleifer 
2000: 775). Other factors will affect the outcome of struggles, but success should 
either way be some positive function of available resources. I follow Cederman & 
Girardin (2005: 6) in using the demographic size of groups as a first cut measure 
of resources. The very high positive correlation between population and 
capabilities (Hegre 2005: 12) would indicate that demographic size is a good 
proxy for resources. 
The potential intervener needs to estimate the probability of government 
success without an intervention in support, as well as the probability of 
government success with a supportive intervention, in order to determine the 
difference between p and q. Recall that, in the interstate dyad TI, both states 
contain two ethnic groups, one ethnic group in power, and one ethnic group 
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without central control. Denote the ethnic group in power in state T  and the 
ethnic group not in power . Denote the relative sizes of the ethnic groups  
and . Let the population in I relative to the population in T be . Then, the 
potential intervener may estimate q as a function of the ratio of resources 
controlled by  to the total resources controlled by the fighting parties,  and 
. Expressed formally,  
TG
τG Ts
τs Is
TG TG
τG
 
( )
( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+= τT
T
sφsφ
sφfq . 
 
When the potential intervener factors in its own intervention in the estimation of 
p, it adds its own resources to that of the government so that  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++
+=
τIT
IT
sφsφsφ
sφsφfp . 
 
The estimation of p will look somewhat different in cases where I favours the 
rebels in T. Then, the potential intervener adds its resources to those of the 
rebels and deprives the government of its support. The contest success function 
(CSF) of p is then 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++= IτT
T
sφsφsφ
sφfp . 
 
The question then becomes what form of the CSF is most appropriate for 
modelling the estimation of p and q. Hirshleifer (2000: 777-779) suggests that the 
ratio form of the CSF may not be ideal. Arguably, the logistic CSF better 
captures the perceived returns to greater fighting effort. In the logistic form, the 
probability of government success with no intervention is expressed as 
 
( )( )TTττ sbsbkq −+= exp1
1 , 
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the probability of government success with an intervention when I favours the 
government is 
 
( )( )( )IITTττ sbsbsbkp +−+= exp1
1 , 
 
and p when the intervener favours the rebels is 
 
( )( )TTIIττ sbsbsbkp −++= exp1
1 , 
 
where k is a ‘decisiveness parameter’, scaling ‘the degree to which a side’s greater 
fighting effort translates into enhanced battle success’, and bi  is a ‘measure of per 
unit-battle effectiveness.’ (Hirshleifer 2000: 775-776)  
Assume now that the potential intervener favours the rebels in T. In order 
to illustrate the advantages of the logistic CSF, Figure 2.1 plots the estimated  
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Figure 2.1: Probability of government success when I intervenes in favour of the 
rebels.  
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probability of government success with intervention when I intervenes on the 
side of the rebels. For illustration, all measures of battle effectiveness, 
. The sizes of  and  are taken to be 1=== IτT bbb TG τG 80%=Ts  and . 
The decisiveness parameter is set to k = 0.04. 
10%=τs
The logistic CSF has two advantages. First, it models that I experiences 
increasing marginal returns to its resources up until it, together with , 
reaches power parity with . That is, the probability of government success, 
which the intervener in this case does not favour, decreases at an increasing rate. 
The end of increasing marginal returns always corresponds to p = 0.5. The 
implication is that, as Hirshleifer (2000: 776) puts it, ‘reinforcement [of the 
rebels] is most welcome when it reverses a force disparity from slight inferiority 
to slight superiority.’ The decision-makers in I seem likely to adhere to this 
perception. A second advantage is that p < 1 even when I provides no intervening 
effort. This reflects that q < 1. The rebels to which I has its allegiance will always 
have some probability of success, even without supportive intervention.  
τG
TG
Whether the rebels receive such support, of course, depends amongst others 
on qp − . Intervention in favour of the rebels is only possible if q exceeds p, and 
becomes more likely the greater the difference is. In order to represent this 
relationship with the relevant CSFs, let the measure of battle effectiveness for 
 and  be the same, assuming that capabilities are spread evenly across the 
population of T, so that 
TG τG
1== τT bb . The battle effectiveness of the intervener 
needs to be differentiated according to its relative capabilities. If the resources of 
a conflict party were to be reduced to the size of that party, then fighting effort 
would solely be a question of demographics. That would ignore the 
disproportionate economic and military capabilities of several countries, 
particularly the more wealthy. Let then 
 
T
I
I escapabiliti
escapabilitib = . 
 
Hence, the difference between p and q is expressed as 
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TI
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I
τ
sskssescapabiliti
escapabilitisk −+
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⎞
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⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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Two major inferences may be drawn from this relationship. First, with 
expression (5) in mind, intervention is possible only if q > p. This holds per 
definition because I adds its own effort to that of the rebels in the denominator of 
p, thus differentiating p from q by reducing its value.  
Second, the sole determinant of the difference between p and q is the 
product of the relative capabilities of I and the relative size of its population. The 
difference between p and q increases as the size of I relative to the target 
increases, and as the relative capabilities of I appreciate. Put differently, large 
and powerful countries are more likely to intervene, ceteris paribus, because they 
are more likely to affect decisively the outcome of the internal conflict. It can be 
shown that, in cases where the intervener favours the government, qp − is 
determined by exactly the same factor. 
The isolation of I
T
I sescapabiliti
escapabiliti ×  as the sole determinant of variation in the 
probability term of the expected utility function provides an opportunity for 
empirical testing of this part of the formal model. A composite measure of 
capabilities and demographic size is to be found in the Correlates of War CINC-
score.3 The statistical analysis will thus test for positive correlation between 
T
I
CINC
CINC  and the probability of intervention. 
So far, I have argued for my choice of a dyadic approach, developed a set of 
expected utility functions on which to peg the causal arguments, and suggested a 
contest success function to model the differences between probabilities of 
government and rebel success. It is time to turn to the possible causal 
mechanisms. In the following section I present a typology of dyads based on the 
different possible configurations of ethnicity and power. I deduce how variation 
in dyadic ethnicity-power patterns may be expected to affect the probability and 
                                                 
3 The CINC-score is described in section 3.6 on control variables.  
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direction of interventions, and I discuss the mechanisms by which variation in 
ethnic domination and diversity may be linked to interventions. The typology of 
configurations of ethnicity and power serves the dual purpose of organising the 
discussion of causal mechanisms, and providing an analytical framework for the 
empirical investigation.  
 
2.4          CONFIGURATIONS OF ETHNICITY AND POWER 
 
 Let me first reiterate the derivation of the dyad typology. Suppose that one deals 
with the generic dyad consisting of state T and state I, in which state T 
experiences internal conflict. State I, in other words, is the potential intervener. I 
assume, first, that either state has two, and only two ethnic groups, of which one 
is in power and one is not.4 I assume, second, that the ethnic group in power in 
state I controls the means of coercion and is the potential executor of 
intervention. Then, dyads are ethnically biased if there are transnational ethnic 
affinities between groups in both states. If one ethnic group in each state has 
ethnic affinity with one ethnic group in the other state, four possible dyadic 
configurations of ethnicity and power emerge. I name the four types of ethnically 
biased dyads the symmetrical majority dyad, the symmetrical minority dyad, the 
asymmetrical majority dyad, and the asymmetrical minority dyad.5 Briefly, in a 
symmetrical majority dyad the two groups in power are ethnically affiliated. In a 
symmetrical minority dyad the ethnic group not in power in state I has ethnic 
ties with its equivalent in state T.  In an asymmetrical majority dyad ethnic 
affinities run between the ethnic group in power in state I and the ethnic 
minority in state T, and in an asymmetrical minority dyad the ethnic group not 
in power in state I has affinity with the ethnic group in power in state T. Dyads 
are ethnically neutral if they contain no transnational ethnic affinities. The 
                                                 
4 I recognise of course that states often have more than two ethnic groups. I assume that there are 
two groups in each state solely for analytical purposes. The typology should at any rate be 
applicable to all civil war dyads in the real world.  
5 In the dyad typology the terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ are short-hand for ‘ethnic group in 
power’ and ‘non-governmental etnic group’. Most ethnic groups in power are also the largest 
ethnic group, but not all (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 20-22).   
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ethnically neutral dyad is the fifth type of dyad, and will serve as a reference 
category.  
As the following discussion will make clear, I expect that ethnic affinities 
are linked to the likelihood of intervention by mechanisms that are determined 
by which configuration of ethnicity and power one has in mind. The analysis will 
focus on the variation in the likelihood of intervention as well as the likely side of 
interventions, particularly referring to changes in costs and utilities.  
 
The asymmetrical majority dyad 
In the asymmetrical majority dyad, the ethnic group in power in state I has 
ethnic affinity with the non-governmental ethnic group in state T, the state with 
internal conflict (Fig. 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I T
Ethnic group in power
Non-governmental ethnic group
Different ethnic groups
Civil conflict 
Line of ethnic affinity 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The asymmetrical majority dyad. 
 
The approach most easily applicable to the asymmetrical majority dyad is 
represented by the contribution of Saideman (2002: 32, 40), who both argues and 
finds empirical evidence that an ethnic group in internal conflict is more likely to 
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receive support, ceteris paribus, when its ethnic kin is in power in a 
neighbouring state. In terms of the differences between utilities and 
probabilities, it is expected that ( ) 0<+ ηEA WW  and ( ) 0<q-p . Saideman’s 
argument also receives conditional support from the empirical work of Davis et 
al. (1997: 160-161). He follows the logic of rational choice. First, Saideman (2002: 
32) assumes that ‘politicians are rational and that they care about gaining and 
holding office’, second, ‘each politician requires the support of others to gain and 
maintain political office – the supporters forming the politician’s constituency’, 
and third, he assumes that ethnic identities influence the preferences of 
constituencies. Two expectations logically follow. First, a dominant ethnic 
constituency may pressure its elite to intervene in favour of its ethnic kin in 
conflict in another country, or second, an ethnic constituency may facilitate such 
intervention with more or less active acquiescence, either way lowering the 
audience costs of intervening. Although Saideman (2002: 32) does not state 
explicitly that the ethnic group receiving support from a third party is not in 
power, the assumption seems reasonable, given that his concern is with 
minorities at risk (Saideman 2002: 33). The argument above should therefore be 
applicable to the asymmetrical majority dyad.  
One such dyad was Bosnia and Yugoslavia. The state T Bosnia had a 
minority Serb population for which the majority Serbs in state I Yugoslavia had 
ethnically based affinity. Thus Yugoslavia intervened in favour of the Bosnian 
Serbs in 1992 (Keylor 1996: 476).   
Although the argument thus far has focused on dyadic dynamics, it is also 
worth asking how the monadic ethnic characteristics of the potential intervener 
bear on the probability of intervention. I raise this issue because it is the central 
concern of two writers (Carment & James 1995, 2000) who have gone far to 
specify the mechanisms by which ethnic interventions may occur. With reference 
to the potential intervener – state I in the asymmetrical majority dyad - Carment 
& James (1995, 2000) suggest that ethnically dominant states are more likely to 
intervene than ethnically pluralist states. With regard to the specification of 
causal mechanisms in a comprehensive theoretical framework, Carment & 
James (1995, 2000) are important contributions.  
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Their theoretical advancement for the purposes of the present investigation 
is two-fold. First, they integrate the elusive concept of ethnic affinities in a 
rational choice framework by linking affective factors to instrumental calculation. 
Second, they specify with some care the mechanisms that turn ethnic affinities 
into incentives for intervention. 
First, with regard to the integration of ethnic affinities in a rational choice 
framework, Carment & James (2000: 176) conceive of affinity as an ‘enabling 
condition’ that provides the ‘crucial link’ between elite and mass behaviour. 
When affinity is in the role of an enabling condition, it serves to lower the 
audience cost of intervention. For example, affinities may be used by elites to 
manipulate mass sentiment in order to mobilise support for interventionist 
policies (Carment & James 2000: 176) Thus, there is interaction between 
affective and instrumental motivations. Further, affinities create both 
constraints and opportunities. Primordial drives within the elites may provide 
opportunities, in which case the utility of success from intervention will be high.  
Alternatively, affinities may create constraints by determining which foreign 
policy options elites may choose in order to please their ethnic constituency, and 
in that way lower the audience costs of intervening (Carment & James 2000: 
177). In other words, ethnic affinity is a non-material factor with material 
consequences. By moving and mobilising people, be they among the masses or in 
the elites, ethnic affinity creates opportunities and constraints that rational 
leaders may capitalise on or be deterred by.  
Second, with regard to the specification of the mechanisms by which ethnic 
affinity is turned into interventionist incentives, Carment & James give special 
significance to the degree of dominance by the ethnic group in power in the 
potential intervener. They coin their two ideal types ‘ethnic domination’ and 
‘ethnic diversity’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). Without giving any clear 
operational criteria, they consider ethnic domination to exist when ‘a single group 
claims control over the decision process on issues concerning other groups’, and 
when ‘leaders can improve the standing of their own ethnic group without 
depending on others’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). A state is ethnically diverse 
when those conditions are not met. Carment & James’ usage of the terms 
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‘domination’ and ‘diversity’ distracts somewhat from the contrasting concepts 
they represent. ‘Ethnic domination’ is useful because it connotes political 
predominance by the ethnic group in power. ‘Ethnic diversity’ is misleading 
because it suggests that states with many ethnic groups are less likely to have a 
predominant ethnic group in power. The decisive issue for Carment & James, 
however, is not how many ethnic groups share territorial unity, but how well 
they weigh in on the political process and limit domination by one ethnic group. 
Thus Russia is defined as ‘ethnically dominant’ even when it has five ethnic 
groups according to Fearon’s (2003) list, whereas the United Kingdom is 
‘ethnically diverse’ even if its number of ethnic groups is in the same order of size 
as Russia (seven, according to Fearon’s (2003) data) (Carment & James 2000: 
190, 191). I substitute the term ‘ethnic pluralism’ for Carment & James’ ‘ethnic 
diversity’ in order to draw attention to the decisive dimension of representation 
rather than diversity. According to Carment & James, states dominated by one 
ethnic group are more likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts than ethnically 
pluralist states, ceteris paribus. The hypothesised mechanisms are as follows.  
In a potential intervener with ethnic domination, institutional mechanisms 
for inter-ethnic conflict management may be underdeveloped. There may in other 
words be no culture for compromise on ethnic issues. As a consequence, ethnic 
issues in the foreign policy domain, such as internal conflicts in other states 
involving ethnic groups for which one has affinity, become particularly 
important. Under such conditions, an elite that seeks support and legitimacy in 
its own dominant ethnic group may estimate that the utility of employing 
successful ethnically directed interventionist policies is higher. Also, the elite 
may frame interventionist policies in ethnic terms in order to lower the costs of 
intervening by mobilising support from the masses, or public pressure may have 
the same effect (Carment & James 2000: 177). In cases where a dominant ethnic 
group controls an ethnically homogenous military, group symbols may be 
manipulated in order to mobilise the population. Ethnic issues are often 
portrayed as redistributive, that is, to the benefit of the dominant ethnic group. 
Interventions are less costly and ethnically oriented foreign policies become more 
likely (Carment & James 2000: 181). Another mechanism of ethnically dominant 
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militarism concerns countries with higher institutional constraints. A 
constituency consisting of a dominant ethnic group that transcends national 
borders may induce political parties, including the governing party, to outbid 
each other with increasingly aggressive ethnic foreign policies, increasing the 
utility of successful intervention, thereby leading to a heightened likelihood of 
intervention (Carment & James 2000: 183).  
This theme of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 54) among 
political entrepreneurs, and their precursors – the ethnic activists -  is taken up 
by both Suhrke & Noble (1977: 12-13) and Lake & Rothchild (1996: 53-54). Lake 
& Rothchild (1996: 53-54) quite clearly highlight ethnic activism and political 
entrepreneurship as factors that may increase the salience (read utility) of ethnic 
politics and the likelihood of intervening in ethnic conflicts. They emphasise the 
role of ethnic activists in the context of social polarisation (Lake & Rothchild 
1996: 53), but there is every reason to believe that such activists in general 
would increase the salience of ethnicity in politics, inclusive of foreign policy, 
lower the audience costs of, for example, intervening in an internal conflict to the 
advantage of ethnic brethren, and simultaneously increase the utility of 
successful intervention. Political entrepreneurs may likewise put pressure on the 
political community to adopt ethnic policies by using ethnicity as a ‘key marker’ 
in order to ‘build constituencies for attaining or maintaining political power.’ 
(Lake & Rothchild 1996: 54) Moderate politicians may feel forced to adopt a 
stronger ethnically based position, engaging in a form of ‘ethnic outbidding’ 
(ibid.). Ethnic policies become more important, including foreign policies, and 
ethnically motivated third-party interventions become more likely.   
In a potential intervener with ethnic pluralism, ethnically based support 
may provide an insufficient constituency for the policy-making elites (Carment & 
James 2000: 178). Issues exclusive to one ethnic group may only give small 
political dividends. Also, the audience costs of intervening are potentially much 
higher. An ethnic foreign policy is risky because it may split a ruling elite when 
it is ethnically mixed, or divide government and military when they are 
controlled by different ethnic groups (Carment & James 2000: 182). Elites will 
have incentives to downplay ethnicity as a source of foreign policy in order to 
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avoid factional conflict and loss of consensus over foreign policy (Carment & 
James 2000: 183). Support must be based on identities that cut across ethnic 
cleavages. As a consequence, ethnically motivated interventions are less likely 
(Carment & James 2000: 178). 
I leave the analysis of the asymmetrical majority dyad by noting first, that 
one may expect ethnic groups in power to intervene in favour of their self-
entrusted ethnic minorities elsewhere, and second, that the likelihood of 
intervention may be tempered by the relative ethnic dominance in the potential 
intervener. My hypotheses will reflect these conclusions.  
 
The symmetrical minority dyad 
In the symmetrical minority dyad, the non-governmental ethnic group in state I 
has ethnic affinity for its equivalent in state T (Fig. 2.3).  
 
 
 
I T
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The symmetrical minority dyad. 
 
The dynamics of the symmetrical minority dyad are suggested by Suhrke & 
Noble (1977: 11), who deduce the possibility of governments cooperating (or for 
present purposes, one government intervening in favour of another) over similar 
ethnic problems, such as similar ethnic minorities seeking independence. Thus, 
in the symmetrical minority dyad, I expect that ( ) 0>+ ηEA WW  and . 
Consider the scenario. State T experiences an internal conflict involving 
secessionist claims from an ethnic group not in power. Suffice secession  to be 
defined inclusively as ‘an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to 
( ) 0>q-p
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withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a 
part.’ (Horowitz 1991: 9-10) In this scenario, the secessionist group is in reality 
part of a stateless nation divided into ethnic minorities by several states, whose 
territorial integrity is threatened by the stateless nation’s actual or potential 
irredentist claims. I use the term irredentism to refer to ‘any political effort to 
unite ethnically, historically, or geographically related segments of a population 
in adjacent countries within a common political framework.’ (Chazan 1991: 1) 
 The dynamic is present in the Kurdish minorities’ relations with their host 
states. A secessionist conflict in state T, particularly one that threatens to be 
successful for the rebel group, is evidently then a material threat to the cohesion 
of state I, whose elite, whatever ethnicity, has strong incentives to intervene in 
favour of the ethnic group in power in state T. Put in terms of the expected 
utility framework, a state fearing for its integrity as a result of a neighbouring 
internal conflict would perceive a soaring difference between the utilities of 
government and rebel success in the civil war state.  
Recall, for example, the introductory case of the Indian intervention in Sri 
Lanka. The state I India intervened in favour of the status quo, and by 
implication the government in state T Sri Lanka in 1987 (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 
123-124). India could not let the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka successfully 
secede due to concern for secessionist ambitions in its own Tamil minority.  
 
The symmetrical majority dyad 
In the symmetrical majority dyad, the ethnic group in power in state I has 
affinity for its counterpart in state T (Fig. 2.4).  
The scenarios that I have discussed so far - the asymmetrical majority dyad 
and the symmetrical minority dyad - represent the most easily argued cases of 
likely intervention, at least in terms of costs and utilities. In the scenario to be 
discussed now - the symmetrical majority dyad - transnational ethnic affinity 
runs between the two ethnic groups in power. The concerned ethnic group in 
state T is presumably quite powerful, given that it archetypically controls the 
means of coercion, and so should be less likely to attract the material support of 
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its ethnic trustees in state I. Still, rebel forces may be very effective battle 
ground actors, and so one should either way expect Saideman’s (2002: 32) logic to 
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Figure 2.4: The symmetrical majority dyad. 
 
apply, as described above. State I, in other words, may find itself in a position 
where ethnic affinity compels it to intervene in state T in favour of the ethnic 
group in power. Public pressure may lower the audience costs of intervening, at 
the same time as the perceived difference between the utilities of government 
and rebel success is greater. As in the symmetrical minority dyad, ( ) 0>+ ηEA WW  
and ( . ) 0>q-p
The state T Cyprus and the state I Greece are an example of a symmetrical 
majority dyad. In one of several instances, Greece intervened in favour of the 
majority Greek Cypriots in 1974, in the ethnic conflict between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 120).  
Thinking about the symmetrical majority dyad provides an opportunity to 
present a complimentary argument to Carment & James’ (2000) above. They 
expect an ethnically dominant state I to be more likely to intervene than the 
ethnically pluralist variety, and their argument may be applied to symmetrical 
majority dyads as well as asymmetrical majority dyads. Whereas Carment & 
James’ argument does not concern ethnic diversity as such, Suhrke & Noble 
(1977: 13-14) address the effect of multiethnicity directly, and their thinking is 
most easily applied to the symmetrical majority dyad. In their mainly deductive 
treatment of the question, they suggest that multiethnic states should be 
expected to be more likely to intervene than more homogenous countries (Suhrke 
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& Noble 1977: 14). They provide no definition of multiethnicity. Let 
multiethnicity be a positive function of the number of ethnic groups in a state.  
Suhrke & Noble (1977: 14) propose that there are strong incentives to 
intervene in internal conflicts on grounds of, amongst others, ethnic kinship ties, 
even if one is a multiethnic state, indeed, as a consequence of being a multiethnic 
state. Given that a neighbouring multiethnic state experiences internal conflict, 
other multiethnic states may perceive an increased utility of successfully 
intervening in favour of the government in conflict in order to ‘establish the 
normative validity of the multiethnic state’ (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 13-14). As 
they put it,  
 
‘a government may be distressed by the ideological precedent posed by a conflict 
elsewhere (that is, it may regard the conflict as a challenge to the principle of 
multiethnicity as a basis for the state structure). This distress may be reinforced by 
ethnic kinship ties, if ethnic kin are dominant in the other state and/or would suffer 
from a weakening of central authority there. Under these circumstances the 
government has strong incentives to intervene in a partisan fashion to restore the 
status quo.’ (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 14)     
 
Although I sympathise with Suhrke & Noble’s (1977: 13-14) conclusion – 
that ethnically diverse states may intervene in other multiethnic states in order 
to safeguard their integrity – I am puzzled by their emphasis on normative 
validity and ideology. It seems somewhat contradictory that a reference to 
ideology shares a paragraph with a reference to concern for weakening political 
power. A pure instrumentally rationalist argument would be more consistent and 
do at least as well: multiethnic states, rather than worrying too much about their 
normative validity, are more interested in maintaining their territorial integrity. 
If nearby internal conflicts have the possibility of rebel success, and if a 
government for which they have ethnic affinity stands to lose their position, then 
neighbouring multiethnic states may have strong incentives to intervene only to 
avert the risk of unravelling themselves. That is, the difference between the 
utility of government and rebel success would be significantly increased. From 
such a more stringent instrumentally rationalist approach, the empirical 
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expectation is Suhrke & Noble’s proposal in a nutshell: multiethnic states may 
be quite likely to intervene in internal conflicts, precisely because of their 
multiethnicity. 
Multiethnicity and ethnic domination are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 
Suhrke & Noble’s (1977: 14) reference to the centrality of ethnic ties in the 
government’s decision to intervene, combined with Carment & James’ (2000: 
182-183) argument that ethnic affinities are downplayed in the foreign policy-
making of ethnically pluralist states, suggests that states that are both 
ethnically dominant and multiethnic are the most likely to intervene. In Chapter 
3 I develop a measure of ethnic domination that is both a positive function of the 
relative size of the ethnic group in power, and a positive function of the number 
of ethnic groups, thus enabling the empirical testing of Carment & James and 
Suhrke & Noble’s hypotheses.     
 
The asymmetrical minority dyad 
In the asymmetrical minority dyad, the non-governmental ethnic group in state I 
has ethnic affinity with the ethnic group in power in the conflict-ridden state, 
state T (Fig. 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5: The asymmetrical minority dyad. 
 
It is least clear how ethnic affinities may be linked to third-party 
intervention in the asymmetrical minority dyad. The most plausible scenario may 
be the following. An  offshoot of the internal conflict in state T is that its ethnic 
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group in power embarks on an irredentist campaign. Given that a minority which 
resides in state I shares ethnic identity with the group in power in T, the 
territorial integrity of I is threatened as a consequence of the irredentist policies 
of T. State I cannot remain indifferent to such a challenge. Among the ways in 
which I can neutralise the threat from state T is an intervention within T 
targeted against the group in power, designed to divert the resources of state T 
away from irredentism and to the campaign at home. In other words 
( ) 0<+ ηEA WW  and , precisely as in the other asymmetrical dyad, and 
the difference between the utilities of rebel and government success would be 
great. Such a causal story is logically plausible, yet depends on a number of 
conditions suggesting that the asymmetrical minority dyad, generally, is the 
scenario in which intervention is least likely to occur.  
( ) 0<q-p
 
The ethnically neutral dyad 
The ethnically neutral dyad contains an internal conflict, but has no groups with 
transnational ethnic affinities (Fig. 2.6).  
 
 
TI 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The ethnically neutral dyad. 
 
The mechanisms linking ethnic affinities to third-party interventions are 
not expected to apply to this dyad. One must turn to the control variables in 
order to explain interventions within ethnically neutral dyads. I define it here in 
order to have a baseline against which to compare the ethnically biased dyads. 
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 2.5          HYPOTHESES 
 
The discussion of the typology of ethnically biased dyads, be they signified by 
symmetry or asymmetry, minority or majority, spawns a set of hypotheses of 
greater and lesser generality that may serve as direction-givers for the empirical 
investigation.  
First, one may deduce a general hypothesis from the distinction between 
ethnically neutral and ethnically biased dyads: 
 
H1: Intervention is more likely to occur in ethnically biased dyads than in 
ethnically neutral dyads, ceteris paribus.  
 
Second, the typology of ethnically biased dyads suggests particular 
hypotheses on the side of interventions: 
 
H2: In the symmetrical dyads state I is more likely to intervene in favour of 
the government in state T than the rebels, ceteris paribus.  
 
H3: In the asymmetrical dyads state I is more likely to intervene in favour of 
the rebels in state T than the government, ceteris paribus.  
 
Third, the discussion of the contest success function in relation to the 
estimation of the difference between p and q suggests that the following be 
tested: 
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H4: The likelihood of intervention is positively associated with the ratio of 
capabilities between I and T.  
 
Finally, in the discussion of the majority dyads – the asymmetrical majority 
dyad and the symmetrical majority dyad – hypotheses on the monadic 
characteristics of the potential intervener were presented. I test empirically: 
 
H5:  Ethnically dominant states are more likely to intervene in internal 
conflicts than ethnically pluralist states, ceteris paribus.  
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3 
METHODS & DATA 
 
I intend to test the hypotheses using statistical modelling of a dataset with some 
reach in space and time. In order to study effects on the occurrence of 
interventions I use logistical regression. The hypotheses on the side of 
interventions are tested with table analysis and multinomial logistic regression. 
In this section I elaborate on my choice of modelling techniques, present the data 
design,  discuss my coding of the ethnicity variables, and derive a set of control 
variables. First, however, a word or two is in order about the approach to 
research of which this inquiry is an incarnation.  
 
3.1          COUNTING VERSUS READING 
 
Having presented in brief the model to be applied in this investigation, it is worth 
taking a step back in order to see and discuss the possibilities, but also the 
limitations inherent in such a research design. Crassly put, why is the emphasis 
on counting rather than reading? Being mindful of what statistical modelling can 
and cannot do will aid in the even-handed reflection on what the empirical 
analysis does and does not tell us. However, before dealing with my choice of 
methods, I will briefly note the range of choices made prior to the vexing 
counting-versus-reading conundrum. The following comments on epistemology 
are intended as a declaration of my approach to research, and are not subjected 
to discussion.    
Of the myriad of approaches to International Relations  research, I take as 
a given that this is 1) an epistemologically empiricist and positivist, 2) a rational 
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choice social-theoretic, and 3) a problem-solving approach to the question of 
ethnicity and intervention. First, it is epistemologically empiricist in the sense 
that the scientism of enquiry relies entirely on empirical validation or 
falsification (Smith 1996: 16). It is epistemologically positivist for its use of  
deductive reasoning, the assumed scientism of its empirical verificationism, the 
implicit assumption that observations are theoretically neutral, and for its 
reliance on the Humean theory of causation – that demonstration of causation 
follows from the discovery of correlation (Smith 1996: 15).   
Second, its social-theoretic approach is rational choice in the sense that 
interests are exogenous to the causal reasoning, and collective outcomes are 
explained in terms of ‘individual goal-seeking under constraints.’ (Snidal 2002: 
74; italics in original.) That is, actors are assumed to choose the course of action 
that involves the least costs and the greatest benefits, given a set of interests.  
Third, the type of theory is ‘problem-solving’ theory in the sense that the 
approach simply seeks to explain an empirical phenomenon which it takes as is. 
It does not question normatively the workings of social relations, ‘it [merely] 
seeks to know that which exists at present.’ (Jackson & Sørensen 2003: 248)   
I will not discuss the relative merits of any of these delimitations. Within 
those perimeters, however, I have made the choice of employing a quantitative 
approach using statistical modelling of extensive data instead of approaching the 
question qualitatively using in-depth data, typically with a comparative case 
study of some sort or another. Given that this is a piece of positivist, problem-
solving research, that choice is not a principled choice. It is a strategic choice. I 
share Grønmo’s (1996: 75) opinion that qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
in principle, are not in a competing relationship, but in a complimentary one. 
Neither approach is better or more scientific than the other (Grønmo 1996: 75). 
Indeed, given a positivist epistemology, the logic underlying a quantitative 
approach and a qualitative comparative approach is exactly the same (King et al. 
1994: 3). Explanatory variables are isolated and analysed by means of controlling 
for variation in other variables, be it statistical control in the case of statistical 
modelling or analytical control in comparative case studies. The science in social 
science is derived from the quality of design, not the type of data it analyses – 
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quantitative or qualitative (King et al. 1994: 7). They are only different in style 
(King et al. 1994: 4). The choice, then, between one style or the other should only 
be made with reference to the research question, as should all methodological 
discussion (Grønmo 1996: 75). Keeping my research question in mind, I will 
discuss the gain from choosing statistical modelling, as well as the loss from 
excluding case-specific insights from the research design.  
In the most general form I ask ‘why do states intervene in internal 
conflicts?’, implicitly asking ‘what are the causes of third-party interventions in 
internal conflicts?’ Given the ‘why’-form of the question, given that I do not ask 
‘by what causal mechanisms?’, and given my reliance on the Humean theory of 
causation, it seems sensible to choose a research design that facilitates 
generalisation about statistical correlations that are valid for as extensive a 
universe as possible. That is precisely what statistical modelling can do. As 
Cederman & Girardin (2005: 1) put it, ‘econometrics allows us to draw systematic 
and precise inference about a large number of cases, provided the underlying 
causal “story” remains stable throughout the population.’ This investigation 
solves the question of stability in the causal narrative by assuming that any 
significant correlation is likely to conform to the causal mechanisms derived by 
deductive logic. The causal story as such is not empirically investigated. The 
emphasis is on correlation. That being said, and as Cederman & Girardin do 
point out (2005: 1), statistical modelling offers the possibility to generalise across 
a large number of cases. Indeed, the entire universe of cases considered relevant 
may be included in a statistical model. In contrast, although generalisation based 
on the investigation of one or a few cases is quite possible (Andersen 1997: 16), 
the extent of such inference is severely limited by the restricted spatio-temporal 
domain of validity associated with comparative case studies.   
Aside from the generality of inference, statistical modelling has the 
advantage of making possible the comparison of the relative sizes of effects. 
Statistical software will report the size of partial effects, indicate multi-causality,  
and test for interaction between variables. As such it is very precise. Hypothesis-
testing techniques will even estimate how precise one’s inference may be. As 
Andersen (1997: 92) points out, case studies cannot do any of this. Instead, case 
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studies may be prone to infer deterministically rather than probabilistically. 
They are unable to uncover either interaction or multi-causality. 
It is also worth noting that statistical modelling has its own way of dealing 
with cases that deviate from theoretically determined empirical expectations. 
Whereas single test cases that do not conform to the empirical expectations of 
general theories easily are cited as disproof of such theories, or more moderately, 
as significantly weakening such theories, deviant cases in statistical models are 
regarded as unexplained variance. Such residual variance does not necessarily 
invalidate the model, but merely indicates that there are causes of the observed 
phenomenon that either are unknown or that apply to only one or a few cases.  
For all the possibilities inherent in a quantitative approach, there are 
significant limitations that must be kept in mind, particularly when interpreting 
and discussing the output of the statistical analyses. International Relations 
scholars with a quantitative bias would do well to remember that statistical 
models cannot uncover causal mechanisms – least of all empirically demonstrate 
them. Hypotheses about causation may be strengthened. Strong associations may 
suggest that some causal mechanism is present. Demonstrating the temporal 
priority of changes may plausibly establish causal direction (Stinchcombe 1968: 
34). The confirmation of empirical expectations by the deductive-nomological 
logic (Smith 1996: 15) will lend weight to general laws about causation. Still, the 
actual uncovering of causal mechanisms is the domain of process-tracing case 
studies. Quantitative work is and will be correlational. 
Implicit in this limitation is the inability of statistical models to convey the 
richness of historical material, the nuance afforded by details, and the 
uniqueness of cases. Case studies are typically appropriate for this, 
conventionally understood as single case or small-N comparisons, focusing on the 
social and historical complexities of associations (Andersen 1997: 19).  
The extent of inference from statistical analyses may be even further 
impaired by the challenges of measurement associated with quantitative data. 
Although data collection is no priority in this investigation, it is worth noting 
that procedures for data collection may not register all relevant data, neither 
may categories and typologies work as intended (Grønmo 1996: 82). Such 
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limitations will impair the measurement validity of the data. Even if statistical 
inference facilitates precise interpretation, the conclusions can only be valid for 
the variables as they are operationalised. Depending on the level of measurement 
validity, one may thereby ask how relevant such interpretation is (Grønmo 1996: 
83). Data may be numerical, but be lacking in depth (ibid.). So may 
interpretations.  
By locating this inquiry on the epistemological and social-theoretic map, 
and by highlighting some of the opportunities and limitations inherent in my 
methodological priorities, the intention has been to recognise the diversity of 
approaches to International Relations, as well as laying the foundation for a fair - 
if sober – discussion of the empirical findings. In the meantime, my statistical 
model requires some more attention. 
 
3.2          THE STATISTICAL MODEL 
 
The choice of logistical regression for studying effects on the occurrence of 
interventions is natural given that the dependent variable is categorical and 
binary. Either an intervention occurred or it did not. The unit of observation is 
the interstate dyad in which one country is in civil conflict. The inquiry is then 
quite simply designed to investigate whether dyads in which intervention occurs 
differ systematically from dyads in which no intervention takes place. I test the 
hypotheses on the side of interventions with simple bivariate table analysis and  
multinomial logistic regression. The table analysis provides a quick test of the 
association between dyad symmetry and intervention side. The multinomial 
logistic regression both replicates the table analysis and controls for possible 
confounding variables. 
The estimation of parameters and standard errors in logistical regression is 
based on binomial or multinomial sampling models that assume independence 
between units of observation (Helland 1999: 23; Agresti 1996: 7-8). The present 
data set may violate this assumption. As indicated in the introduction, more than 
one intervention occurred in several civil conflicts. Indeed, the 79 interventions 
recorded in the data were distributed on a mere 41 conflicts. Twenty-two of those 
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conflicts experienced 2 – 5 interventions. The decision by one state to intervene 
most likely influences the choices of other states. Hence, both interventions and 
non-interventions within the same conflict must be expected to depend on each 
other. I compensate for this by using the Huber-White estimator of variance, 
often referred to as a robust estimator of variance (Stata User’s Guide 2005: 275). 
I cluster the estimation of robust standard errors by civil conflict, based on the 
assumption that each conflict gives rise to a unique set of contingencies so that 
interventions or non-interventions in different conflicts may be treated as 
independent of each other. 
With regard to the estimation of coefficients, the choice of regular maximum 
likelihood logistical regression estimation is not uncontroversial. King & Zeng 
(2001: 703-705) argue that applications of logistical regression to the study of 
rare events are typically prone to two misrepresentations: they generate biased 
coefficients and underestimated probabilities, and their methods of calculating 
probabilities lead to additional errors. Interventions are rare events. In the 
present data, interventions occur in less than 2 percent of the dyads. When I 
nonetheless choose to proceed with logistical regression instead of using King & 
Zeng’s (2001: 702) ‘ReLogit’ computation, I do so, observing that the difference in 
approaches is somewhat irrelevant to my purposes. ReLogit is argued to calculate 
probabilities as well as relative changes in probabilities with greater accuracy 
than logistical regression. That may be, but I am hesitant to put primary 
analytical emphasis on the calculation of absolute probabilities or the effects on 
probabilities of single variables. Flaws in measurement validity and the 
historical contingency of samples are sufficient sources of uncertainty to suggest 
that the analysis of estimated probabilities is a perilous exercise. More faith may 
be put in interpreting the signs of coefficients and comparing effects between 
variables based on odds ratios. Nothing in King & Zeng (2001) suggests that such 
mild scepticism of the accuracy of statistical inference justifies the extra effort to 
employ ReLogit.  
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3.3          DATA 
 
The backbone of the data is the interventions data set analysed in Lemke & 
Regan (2004). To that I have added ethnicity variables, as well as data on 
capabilities, geographical proximity, and a macroeconomic indicator. I adopt 
Lemke & Regan’s (2004: 155) data design, whose unit of analysis is the civil war 
dyad. Each civil war country paired with each other country in the international 
system is thus taken as one observation, irrespective of how long the internal 
conflict has lasted, or whether it is ongoing. The data set includes all internal 
conflicts that began between 1944 and 1994, beginning with the Greek civil war, 
1944 - 1949, and ending with the conflict over Chechnya, 1994 and ongoing 
(Regan 2000: 153-158). Below, I present the dependent variables, the ethnicity 
variables, and the control variables in turn. 
 
3.4          DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
As indicated by the set of hypotheses, two dependent variables are to be 
analysed: the occurrence of intervention and the side of intervention. 
 
Intervention  
Conceptually, interventions are cases in which states mobilise significant 
resources in order to influence the course and outcome of civil conflicts (Regan 
2000: 9). Indeed, much of my discussion has been devoted to suggest 
circumstances under which states would be willing to mobilise such resources. 
The operational art is in distinguishing cases of real intervention from mere 
attempts at influence (ibid.). The decisive two criteria are that interventions 
break with the conventions of international relations, and that they are designed 
to change or preserve the authority structures in the target state (ibid.). 
Accordingly, Regan (2000: 10) register as interventions ‘convention-breaking 
military and / or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country 
targeted at the authority structures of the government and opposition forces.’ 
 48
‘Intervention’ is a dichotomous variable in the Lemke & Regan data set, 
indicating whether I intervened in T within a civil war dyad.  
 
Side of intervention  
Another central concern with this investigation is whether states intervene in 
favour of the government or the rebels. For that purpose, the Lemke & Regan 
data set contains two dummy variables, one indicating whether interventions 
favoured the government, the other on whether interventions favoured the 
opposition. One of 79 interventions favoured neither.  
 
3.5          ETHNICITY VARIABLES 
 
When explaining the incidence and side of interventions, the preoccupation here, 
of course, is with the possible effects of various configurations of ethnicity. The 
set of hypotheses suggests that three central dimensions be measured: the 
existence of transnational ethnic affinities, the type of dyad if such affinities are 
present, and the ethnic domination in potential interveners.  
 
Ethnically biased dyad  
The question of transnational ethnic affinities is in distinguishing ethnically 
biased dyads from those that are ethnically neutral. I operationalise ethnically 
biased dyads as dyads in which members of the same ethnic group reside in both 
states. This is an operational short-hand for the theoretical definition of 
transnational ethnic affinities, that nonetheless has had some usage (Davis et al. 
1997: 157; Davis & Moore 1997: 176; Saideman 2002: 37), but that has some very 
clear limitations in terms of measurement validity. As I will elaborate on in the 
discussion of the results, this operationalisation implicitly assumes that 
transnational bonds between similar ethnic groups are politically relevant, and 
that transnational ethnic affinities only exist between groups with the same 
ethnic identity. Both assumptions are dubious. The resort to such an 
operationalisation is a pragmatic response to two factors: the meagre offerings of 
ready cross-sectional data on ethnicity, and the recognition that, as a short-hand, 
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the identification of similar ethnic groups does provide a rough measure of 
transnational ethnic affinities.  
I code as ethnically biased dyad pairs of states containing groups with the 
same ethnic identity according to Fearon’s (2003) list of ethnic groups. In order to 
refine the measure somewhat, dyads in which the same ethnic group in both 
countries was part of a diaspora when neither country was the homeland were 
excluded. Thus Malaysia and Mongolia, for instance, were not coded as an 
ethnically biased dyad, even if both countries have a Chinese population. This 
move was based on the assumption that transnational ethnic affinities within 
diasporas, excluding relations with the home country, are of no political 
relevance. Intra-diaspora transnational relations run mainly between home 
countries and areas of settlement (Van Hear 2002: 234-235), and diaspora 
cultures are as a rule not irredentist or separatist (Clifford 1994: 307-308). I treat 
the Romanies as a diaspora even if they have no contemporary home state 
(Chaliand & Rageau 1995: 96-110). The variable ethnically biased dyad is a 
dummy indicating whether dyads are ethnically biased or not.  
 
Ethnic domination in potential intervener  
The operational guidelines for measuring ethnic domination are derived from 
Carment & James (2000). Ethnic domination exists, they suggest, when ‘a single 
group claims control over the decision process on issues concerning other groups’, 
and when ‘leaders can improve the standing of their own ethnic group without 
depending on others’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). At issue, it seems, is the 
relative predominance of the ethnic group in power. What degree of sovereignty 
does it enjoy? Predominance should be a positive function of size. Larger groups 
should have more power than smaller groups, ceteris paribus. But size is not all. 
Ethnic domination should also be contingent on the dynamics of ethnic politics. 
Other ethnic groups may be in a position to reign in a potentially dominant 
ethnic group in power. A united opposition should limit ethnic domination, 
whereas fractionalised ethnic politics may facilitate the predominance of one 
ethnic group. Ethnic domination should therefore also be a positive function of 
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the number of ethnic groups. I operationalise ethnic domination as the product of 
the relative size of the ethnic group in power and the number of ethnic groups,  
 
II nEGIPsize × , 
 
where both relative size and number of ethnic groups are taken from Fearon’s 
(2003) data.  
 
Dyad type  
I have argued that one may explain the side of interventions by differentiating 
between different types of ethnically biased dyads. In order to categorise the 
ethnically biased dyads according to configurations of ethnic groups and power, I 
rely on Cederman & Girardin’s (2005) identification of ethnic groups in power 
(EGIP), based on Fearon’s (2003) list of ethnic groups. The variable dyad type is 
disaggregated into four dummy variables, each indicating whether a dyad is a 
symmetrical majority, symmetrical minority, asymmetrical majority, or an 
asymmetrical minority dyad. Considering that Hypotheses 2 and 3 on the side of 
interventions primarily hinge on the symmetry or asymmetry of ethnically biased 
dyads, the dyad type dummy variables are also aggregated into two dichotomous 
variables indicating whether a dyad is symmetrical or asymmetrical. Thus, the 
symmetrical minority dyad Sri Lanka / India and the symmetrical majority dyad 
Cyprus / Greece, for example, are both coded as ‘1’ for symmetrical, because they 
both are expected to experience intervention in favour of the government. Indeed, 
they both did. When coding dyad types, some dyads were clearly ambiguous in 
that they could be coded within two or three of the categories. The dyad TI 
Bosnia / Yugoslavia, for example, was coded as ethnically biased with reference 
to both Serbs and Muslims, and could accordingly be categorised as both 
asymmetrical majority and asymmetrical minority. In such cases I have chosen 
one dyad type over the other by determining which ethnic group was most salient 
for relations between the two states. Bosnia / Yugoslavia is coded as an 
asymmetrical majority dyad because the minority Serbs in Bosnia and their 
campaign for power is considered to have been decisive for Yugoslavia’s 
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intervention in Bosnia. An overview of the remaining ambiguous dyads and their 
resolution is provided in the appendix. 
The reliance on Cederman & Girardin’s coding of EGIP for determining 
dyad types imposes certain spatial limitations on the data set. Theirs is a work 
in progress, and at present the coding of EGIP is limited to North Africa, Europe 
and Asia. That is, the Americas, Oceania, and sub-Saharan Africa are excluded. 
Lemke & Regan’s (2004) data set of 19,533 civil war dyads is thus reduced to 
4,336 dyads. From having encompassed 138 civil conflicts and 187 interventions, 
the corresponding frequencies are now 69 and 79. Note, however, that the 
relative drop in numbers of civil conflicts and interventions (50% and 58%) is not 
as great as the relative drop in the number of dyads (78%). I choose to proceed 
with the empirical analyses within this restricted spatial domain, recognising 
that the theoretical harvest from identifying ethnic groups in power is sufficient 
to preclude discarding the data, and registering that the number of conflicts and 
interventions still enables some statistical inference. Also, it is not apparent that 
the inquiry’s regional selectivity significantly impairs its external validity.6 
Table 3.1 summarises some descriptive statistics on the data set.  
 
3.6          CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
The primary purpose of this investigation is to study variation in the 
probabilities of intervention and intervention sides in civil conflicts. Some of that 
variation may be accounted for by ethnic affinities, and that will be tested on the 
data. Whether ethnic affinities have significant effects or not, other variables 
most certainly explain much variation in the probability of interventions and 
their sides. These must be included in any model of intervention worth its claim 
to explanatory power. In more technical terms, it is necessary to include a set of 
control variables in order to disaggregate correlations into partial components. 
Only that way may  the variance – however minute – accounted for by ethnic 
                                                 
6 The exclusion of Latin America, for example, should not be a great problem due to the large 
number of non-ethnic conflicts there (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 10n). If one included sub-
Saharan Africa, one should only expect to strengthen any findings on ethnicity variables due to 
the salience of ethnic politics in the region (Horowitz 1985: 6).  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics on the data set, absolute frequencies. 
 
Dyads 4336 
Ethnically biased dyads 382 
 
Symmetrical majority 
dyads 
 
 
108 
Symmetrical minority 
dyads 
 
 
33 
Sum of 
symmetrical 
dyads: 
 
141 
Asymmetrical majority 
dyads 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dyadic 
statistics 
Asymmetrical minority 
dyads 
 
 
139 
Sum of 
asymmetrical 
dyads: 
 
241 
Conflicts 69 
Conflicts with 
interventions 
 
 
41 
Interventions 79 
Min. interventions per 
conflict 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Conflict 
statistics 
Max. interventions per 
conflict 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
affinity, be extracted from the empirical noise made by the data. 
In the following I present a list of ten control variables. Some argue that 
such inflationary control variable practices are methodically reckless and 
substantively meaningless. Ray (2003: 21) and Achen (2004: 17), for example, 
agree that multivariate analyses ought to have no more than three explanatory 
factors. Ray’s (2003: 16-17) argument turns on the need to limit the number of 
independent variables in  order to better specify the causal linkages between 
them. Achen’s (2004: 6, 17) preoccupation is with the use and misuse of 
monotonicity as a proxy for linearity, and the need for a return to the careful 
inspection of data using graphical analyses, partial regression plots, and non-
linear fitting. They both offer timely textbook criticism of many scholars’ 
disregard of basic preconditions for statistical modelling: the specification of 
interrelationships between independent variables, and the investigation of the 
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functional form of correlations. I choose to employ a larger set of control variables 
because the purpose of my analysis is different from the sorts of analyses 
addressed by Ray and Achen. My purpose is not to study the causal links 
between explanatory factors in their direct, indirect, or spurious forms. My 
purpose, rather, is to test whether ethnicity variables explain additional variance 
after controlling for variables that already are established as having effects on 
the likelihood of intervention. To that end, a full set of explanatory factors is 
needed.  
 
Opportunity and willingness  
The independent variables address two different aspects of the choice to 
intervene: the opportunity to intervene, and – given the opportunity – the 
willingness to intervene (Starr 1978: 364, 376). Distinguishing between the two is 
important in order to understand why interventions are such rare events. Of the 
4336 dyads in the data only 79 experience an intervention. That is less than 2 
percent. Given that I seek to explain variation in the incidence of interventions, 
then non-interventions are in a sense as interesting as interventions. Prediction 
is complicated, however, by the fact that there are two classes of states that do 
not intervene, those that consider intervention but choose not to, and those for 
whom intervention is not even an option (Lemke & Regan 2004: 152). The line 
between the two may run between states with the opportunity to intervene and 
those without such opportunity. It is reasonable to infer that states with 
opportunity should be separated from the lot before the choice to intervene is 
fairly assessed, but efforts to create samples based on a dichotomous conception 
of opportunity have created major selection bias7 (Clark & Regan 2003: 97). Such 
bias stems from the fact that the factors that determine opportunity also affect 
the willingness to engage in conflict (Clark & Regan 2003: 98; Siverson & Starr 
1991: 25). It is better then to treat all states as potential interveners, and include 
the determinants of opportunity in the model. That would allow for the intuition 
that opportunity is continuous, something states have to a greater or lesser 
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extent (Clark & Regan 2003: 101; Siverson & Starr 1991: 24). As has been widely 
practiced, I model opportunity as a function of geographic proximity and power 
(Clark & Regan 2003: 100; Starr 1978: 368). The willingness to intervene is 
primarily thought of in terms of the ethnicity variables as well as the set of 
control variables.   
I have selected the control variables among those found to have significant 
effects in three different studies of third-party interventions in internal conflicts: 
Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), and Lemke & Regan (2004). They all investigate 
empirically why states intervene in internal conflicts, albeit with somewhat 
differing emphases. Derived from these studies and the discussion of opportunity 
and willingness, the following variables suggest themselves as candidates for 
statistical control.  
 
Power asymmetry  
The absolute capabilities of the potential intervener should be directly related to 
its opportunity to intervene. In other words, capabilities are expected to 
determine which class of states that truly can contemplate intervention, and the 
group of states for which intervention is no option. The capabilities of a potential 
intervener indicate its ability to project power (Boulding 1962 / 1988: 231). 
Consequently, one should expect the likelihood of intervention to be directly 
proportional to the capabilities of state I.  
On the other hand, the relative capabilities of the potential intervener 
should be directly related to its willingness to intervene. Given that interventions 
are attempts at influencing the course of internal conflicts, and as such require 
the mobilisation of significant resources, interventions in relatively more 
powerful states are expected to be more costly and therefore less likely, ceteris 
paribus. The likelihood of intervention should therefore be inversely proportional 
to the capabilities of state T. I integrate the opportunity aspect of power with its  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 For a brief survey of efforts to sample cases on different conceptions of opportunity, see Clark & 
Regan (2003: 95-99).  
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willingness aspect in a measure of power asymmetry, thus hypothesising that the 
likelihood of intervention is positively correlated with 
 
T
I
escapabiliti
escapabiliti . 
 
Note that this measure is identical to the indicator of per unit-battle 
effectiveness of state I, bI , in the contest success function, and that its relation to 
the likelihood of intervention is posited to be the same. The empirical testing of 
power ratio will therefore also indicate whether the CSF of the difference 
between p and q is a plausible formalisation of the probability terms in the 
expected utility functions. 
I measure capabilities as the natural log of power ratio8, lagged by one year 
prior to the outbreak of civil conflict, using the Correlates of War ‘Composite 
Index of National Capability’ (CINC), version 3.02 (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 
1972). The CINC-score is constructed by taking country year values for total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, 
military personnel, and military expenditure, converting them to a country’s 
share of world total in that particular year, and averaging across the six 
dimensions (www.correlatesofwar.org).   
 
The economic size of the potential intervener  
It is necessary to control for the size of the potential intervener in order to 
minimise omitted variable bias in the effect of power ratio. Hegre (2005: 14) 
                                                 
8 Power asymmetry is only one of several variables that have been log-transformed. Such 
manipulation reduces outlier problems and models non-linear change in the logit. Thus a 
marginal increase in power asymmetry or any of the other log-transformed variables has a 
greater effect when the measure already is low than when it is high. Assume for illustration that 
the logistic regression returns a coefficient estimate for ln(power ratio) of 0.5. A one-unit increase 
in power asymmetry from 1:1 to 2:1 would then be associated with a 40% increase in the odds of 
intervention, whereas an equal increase in power asymmetry from 100:1 to 101:1 would predict 
only a 0.5% increase in the odds of intervention. Log-transformation, in other words, models 
decreasing marginal returns.   
 56
demonstrates how severe such bias may be. In the context of interventions, power 
asymmetry as measured by power ratio must be controlled for the absolute size of 
the potential intervener in order to exclude the suggestion that great powers 
would seize any opportunity to intervene in small countries. By holding the 
absolute size of the potential intervener constant, the remaining effect of power 
asymmetry is more due to variation in the size of the target state. Economic size 
is a good proxy for other measures of size or power (Hegre 2005: 12).  
Economic size is measured as the natural log of GDP in constant 1995 
dollars, lagged by one year prior to the outbreak of internal conflict. The GDP 
data is taken from Maddison (1995), Penn World Tables, version 5.6 (Summers & 
Heston 1991) and the World Bank (2000), and standardised as described in Gates 
et al. (2005: 19-20).  
 
Distance  
Distance is like power considered to be a central dimension of the opportunity to 
intervene (Clark & Regan 2003: 100). The further a potential intervener is from 
the target state, the more costly it is to project force, and the less likely an 
intervention is expected to occur, ceteris paribus (Boulding 1962 / 1988: 230; 
Gleditsch & Singer 1974: 483-484).  
Distance is measured as the natural log of the distance between the capital 
cities of T and I. The data was compiled as described by Gleditsch (1995: 305).  
 
Joint borders  
As evidenced by the range of references in the discussion below, borders - or more 
precisely – contiguity, is a widely and well established correlate of interstate 
interaction, be it war or intervention. The effect of borders on the likelihood of 
intervention is found to be significant by both Regan (1998: 772), Pickering (2002: 
308), and Lemke & Regan (2004: 161).  
Why this association between contiguity and war? Starr & Most (1978: 451) 
apply a quintessentially neorealist logic by suggesting that ‘borders and war are 
 57
positively related’ (Starr & Most 1978: 451) because 1) borders lead to greater 
interstate interaction that in and of itself may lead to war, 2) borders create a 
presence of threat that may lead to pre-emption, and  3) borders create 
uncertainty that may induce war as an uncertainty-reducing device (Starr & 
Most 1978: 445). Diehl (1991: 20) confirms this in his survey of literature on 
geography as a facilitating condition for war. Whereas Starr & Most (1978) 
engage the question of interstate war, Regan (1998: 766) links borders to third-
party interventions in internal conflicts. With contiguity to a country in internal 
conflict, the argument goes, follows the possibility of contagion. Any prospect of 
diffusion of internal conflict increases the risk of not intervening. 
Simultaneously, contiguity lowers the material cost of mounting an intervention, 
and allows for a better estimate of the probability of success (Regan 1998: 766). 
Whether one is a Starr & Most (1978), a Diehl (1991), or a Regan (1998), the 
empirical expectation is still the same. Contiguity raises the probability of 
interaction, of war - and for my purposes – of intervention.       
For operationalisation, I replicate Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) by applying a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether states are contiguous by land or not.9  
 
Alliances  
The effect of alliances on the likelihood of intervention, found by both Lemke & 
Regan (2004: 161) and Aydin (2005: 23), is cogently explained by Lemke & Regan 
(2004: 153), whose argument turn on the question of interstate interaction: 
 
‘states interacting regularly and significantly with the civil war state are likely to 
care more about the civil war’s outcome, are thus more likely to undertake the cost-
benefit calculation, and ultimately are more likely to intervene. That is, the pool of 
potential intervenors can be thought of in terms of their geographical relationship 
and/or their previous political and economic interactions.’ (Lemke & Regan 2004: 
153) 
                                                 
9 For a brief discussion of different sorts of contiguity, see Lemke & Regan (2004: 155). 
Bremer’s (1992: 327) findings would appear to suggest that contiguity may as well include both 
proximity by land and sea. 
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 Alliances are included in Lemke & Regan’s (2004: 153) conception of such 
political interactions. States in alliance are presumed to interact more at the 
present, care more about each others’ internal development, and expect more 
interaction to take place in the future (Lemke & Regan 2004: 153). Alliance 
members will as a consequence be more likely to consider intervention, and more 
likely to actually intervene (ibid.).  
Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) use Gibler & Sarkees’ (2004: 214) definition of 
an alliance as a treaty that ‘must contain language that would qualify it as a 
defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression pact, or an entente’. I use Lemke & 
Regan’s (ibid.) dichotomous indicator of whether T and I have entered such an 
alliance.   
 
Colonial history  
Much like the effect of alliances, a colonial history is again thought by Lemke & 
Regan (2004: 153) to signify closer interaction between state T and state I. As 
they put it, ‘former colonial powers of the civil war state are likely to interact 
frequently with the civil war state, anticipate they will continue to do so in the 
future, and thus be more likely to think about and actually intervene.’ (Lemke & 
Regan 2004: 153) Their empirical expectation holds water during testing. They do 
indeed find evidence that former colonial metropoles of states with internal 
conflict are more likely to intervene (Lemke & Regan 2004: 161).   
The operationalisation of colonial history is a replication of that employed 
by Lemke & Regan (2004: 156). The variable is dichotomised, indicating whether 
state I was a previous coloniser of state T or not. The variable is coded zero for all 
dyads in which T never was a colony (Lemke & Regan 2004: 156).   
 
Conflict intensity  
Regan (1998: 772) finds that the intensity of the internal conflict has a negative 
effect on the likelihood of intervention. It would seem that the more intense an 
internal conflict is, the more reluctant is an external party to get involved. The 
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observation is not surprising. An explanation based on rational choice sensibly 
summarises the logic. Given that the purpose of intervening is to affect the 
conflict in one way or another, one should expect greater conflict intensity to 
increase the costs of intervention, at the same time as more intense conflicts 
lower the expected probability of success (Regan 1998: 766). 
I adopt Regan’s (1998: 770) operationalisation of conflict intensity, 
replicated in Lemke & Regan (2004: 154), measuring it by number of casualties 
per year. I log-transform the variable.      
 
The type of internal war –  ideological war / ethnic war  
Pickering (2002: 309) finds that dummy variables indicating whether an internal 
conflict is a revolutionary war or ethnic war have significant effects on the 
likelihood of intervention. There is scant specification of why that may be so, 
however. In his theoretical explanation for why internal wars may attract foreign 
interventions, he does not distinguish between different types of internal wars 
(Pickering 2002: 306). The emphasis is on how internal conflict in a potential 
intervener may induce leaders to use diversionary force, how internal conflicts 
may impair states to the extent that they become targets for exploitation by 
intervention, and how internal conflicts may compel the parties to the conflict to 
seek external aid, much like Modelski’s (1964: 20) classic account of the 
internationalisation of internal conflict (Pickering 2002: 306).  
One may presume, however, that internal conflicts over different issues 
have different effects on the likelihood of intervention. Given that the focus of 
this investigation is on ethnic affinities, one may expect there to be interaction 
between type of internal conflict and variation in ethnic affinities. Will the effect 
of ethnic affinities be more pronounced in the case of ethnic wars? This must be 
put to the test. I test for an effect of the type of civil war on the likelihood of 
intervention, as well as an interaction effect by an ethnic war dummy on 
ethnically biased dyad.  
By way of measurement, Lemke & Regan (2004) provide two dummy 
variables indicating whether a civil conflict was ideological or ethnic. At question 
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is the ‘orientation of the primary groups involved in the fighting’ (Regan 1996: 
342), determined by data from Minorities at Risk and the Correlates of War 
cultural data set. The two categories are mutually exclusive. Conflicts that are 
neither coded as ideological nor ethnic are coded as religious. Religious conflict 
thus serves as the baseline.  
 
The Cold War  
As an historic watershed, and perhaps as an historic exception, the emergence 
and retreat of the Cold War affected the dynamics of great power relations in 
major ways. The Cold War provided added and protracted opportunities to 
intervene. Major powers frequently intervened in an increased number of 
persistent conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2004: 8). Internal conflicts during the Cold 
War provided important proxy battle grounds for fervent cold warriors (Regan 
1998: 767). Given that a state of nuclear terror prevented direct interstate 
clashes between the great powers of the East and the West, internal conflicts 
provided opportunities to confront the adversary in a third country. The Cold 
War also increased the utility of successful intervention because internal conflicts 
so easily were cast in terms of the ideological confrontation between the East and 
the West (Regan 1998: 767). The perceived stakes were high, and so the great 
powers were quite willing to intervene in order to avert the advance of a rival 
bloc. Such incentives to intervene disappeared with the Cold War. The resolution 
of several protracted conflicts during the 1990s also reduced the opportunities to 
intervene (Gleditsch et al. 2004: 9). As one should expect, Regan (1998: 772) finds 
that the period of the Cold War had a significant effect on the likelihood of 
intervention. Internal conflicts were more likely to attract third-party 
interventions during the Cold War than after.  
I replicate Regan (1998: 771) and Lemke & Regan (2004: 154), who treat the 
Cold War as a dichotomous variable indicating whether it was present or not. 
The Cold War is defined as ending on 1 January 1989.  
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4 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results from the statistical analyses with some 
preliminary comments. A more thorough discussion will follow in the next and 
penultimate chapter.  
Table 4.1 contains the coefficient estimates from the logistic regression of 
the occurrence of interventions. The coefficients, i , cannot be linearly mapped 
onto the probability of intervention. Rather, they estimate linear change in the 
natural log of the odds of intervention, 
β
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− p
p
1
ln . Of the ways in which the 
coefficients may be made sense of, I prefer the simple conversion of  into odds 
ratio, defined as . The odds ratio indicates the relative change in the odds of 
intervention resulting from a one-unit increase in an explanatory variable, 
controlled for all other variables.  
iβ
iβe
As discussed in section 3.2, standard errors are robust and clustered by civil 
conflict, due to some expected dependence between units of observation. The 
estimation of robust standard errors has the consequence that the log-likelihood 
statistic is represented by a proxy, the log pseudolikelihood. Table 4.1 presents a 
sequence of models that I now will elucidate.  
Model 1 is a bivariate regression with ethnically biased dyad as the 
explanatory variable. The bivariate effect of transnational ethnic affinities, as 
they are operationalised, is positive and highly significant. The odds ratio, 
. The model suggests that ethnically biased dyads’ odds of experiencing 
intervention are twenty times higher than the odds for ethnically neutral dyads. 
20.39=βe
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Table 4.1: Logistic regression estimates, probability of third-party interventions 
in civil conflicts. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Constant -4.908*** 
(0.222) 
-0.615 
(1.214) 
-0.936 
(1.330) 
-2.607* 
(1.568) 
-3.512 
(3.188) 
-3.060 
(3.217) 
-4.782 
(3.047) 
Ethnically 
biased dyad 
3.015*** 
(0.245) 
1.858*** 
(0.308) 
1.897*** 
(0.299) 
2.458*** 
(0.470) 
2.454*** 
(0.468) 
2.110*** 
(0.467) 
2.288*** 
(0.507) 
Ethnic 
domination 
in 
intervener 
  0.277*** 
(0.085) 
0.219* 
(0.118) 
0.215* 
(0.115) 
0.210* 
(0.112) 
0.203* 
(0.113) 
Joint 
borders 
 1.378*** 
(0.376) 
1.149*** 
(0.392) 
1.461*** 
(0.430) 
1.440*** 
(0.445) 
1.286*** 
(0.463) 
1.494*** 
(0.462) 
ln Distance  -0.535*** 
(0.153) 
-0.596*** 
(0.168) 
-0.556*** 
(0.181) 
-0.583*** 
(0.193) 
-0.740*** 
(0.230) 
-0.569*** 
(0.188) 
ln Power 
ratio 
   0.725*** 
(0.085) 
0.710*** 
(0.097) 
0.718*** 
(0.110) 
0.665*** 
(0.106) 
Ethnic 
conflict 
     -0.968 
(0.715) 
 
Ethnic 
conflict ×  
Ethnically 
biased dyad 
     0.990 
(0.914) 
 
Ideological 
conflict 
     0.433 
(0.422) 
 
ln GDPI     0.047 
(0.132) 
0.082 
(0.127) 
0.062 
(0.121) 
ln Conflict 
intensity 
      0.008 
(0.093) 
Allied       -0.002 
(0.610) 
Colonial 
history 
      1.093** 
(0.496) 
Cold War       0.927*** 
(0.349) 
N 4336 4336 4336 3258 3258 3258 3206 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-319.679 -291.715 -286.220 -157.873 -157.810 -154.330 -153.708 
Pseudo-R2 0.190 0.261 0.275 0.399 0.399 0.412 0.413 
 
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil conflict). 
 
Model 2 controls the effect of ethnically biased dyad for joint borders and 
distance. This is necessary because a major proportion of the variance in ethnic 
bias is likely to be accounted for by contiguity and proximity. Adjacent states are 
more likely to include the same ethnic group. Similarly, the density and reach of 
diasporas should roughly be a negative function of distance. The further states 
are from each other, the less likely they are ethnically biased. Model 2 confirms 
this by reducing the direct effect of ethnically biased dyad ( ), which 6.41=βe
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nonetheless still is positive and significant. Simultaneously, the model confirms 
the common knowledge that the probability of intervention is a positive function 
of contiguity, and a negative function of distance (Aydin 2005: 23; Clark & Regan 
2003: 100; Gleditsch 1995: 308; Pickering 2002: 308; Regan 1998: 772).  
Model 3 adds the variable ethnic domination in intervener to the analysis. 
To the extent that this measure captures the conceptual meaning of an ethnic 
group in power’s domestic predominance, the estimate confirms Carment & 
James’ (2000) expectation that ethnically dominant states are more likely to 
intervene than ethnically pluralist states. The model suggests, for example, that 
states with an ethnic domination score of 6 (max. = 6.125) have an odds of 
intervening that is 4 times higher than states with an ethnic domination score of 
1 (min. = 0.48). Ethnic domination was not expected to covariate with the other 
variables in the model. That is confirmed by the marginal alterations in the 
effects of ethnically biased dyad, joint borders, and distance.   
In model 4 I add the variable power ratio, discussed conceptually in the 
context of the contest success functions and the opportunity versus willingness 
distinction. The estimation of a positive and significant coefficient confirms two 
expectations. First, it lends empirical credibility to the CSF formalisation of the 
probability terms in the expected utility functions. Power asymmetry in favour of 
the intervener leads to a heightened likelihood of intervention. Second, it 
confirms the expectation, and widely reported result, that the likelihood of 
conflictual engagement is a positive function of the ability to project power 
(Boulding 1962 / 1988: 230-231; Clark & Regan 2003: 110; Hegre 2005: 4-5). In 
order to facilitate comparison with model 5, the sample was defined by having no 
missing values on either power ratio or GDPI, a variable to which I turn next.  
Model 5 is distinguished from model 4 only by its inclusion of GDPI. The 
samples are identical in order to exclude sample effects on changes in coefficient 
estimates. The purpose is to study GDPI ‘s influence on the effect of power ratio. 
The minute decrease in the effect of power ratio (from 0.725 to 0.710) suggests 
that power ratio suffers from no omitted variable bias in model 4 from the 
exclusion of GDPI . The non-significance of GDPI in model 5 does not imply that it 
is unimportant. Indeed, a replication of model 4 with power ratio replaced by 
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GDPI returns a coefficient estimate for GDPI of 0.436 with p < 0.0005. Rather, 
the non-significance of GDPI indicates that most of the covariance between the 
size of the potential intervener and the probability of intervention is accounted 
for by power ratio. Power asymmetry matters more than the absolute power of 
the potential intervener. I nonetheless include GDPI in the remaining models. 
Model 6 includes the predictors ideological conflict, ethnic conflict and an 
interaction term between ethnic conflict and ethnically biased dyad. None of 
them have significant effects, which is quite at variance with the findings of 
Lemke & Regan (2004: 161). The poor performance of these variables is probably 
best explained by the reduced and regionally defined sample of cases. I regard 
them as inconclusive, yet I take note of their contingence on geographical 
domain. The type of internal conflict may matter less for interventions in some 
parts of the world than others. I exclude these variables from the last analysis. 
Model 7 thus includes the variables for which robust effects were estimated 
in models 4 through 6, GDPI, as well as the remaining control variables conflict 
intensity, allied, colonial history, and Cold War. Neither conflict intensity nor 
allied have significant coefficient estimates, but colonial history and Cold War 
have sizeable and significant positive effects on the probability of intervention. 
The latter two coefficients confirm previous findings (Lemke & Regan 2004: 161-
162) and testify to the robustness of these associations since the spatial domain 
of the present sample is limited.  
To conclude this overview of the various models, it is notable that the 
variables I have been most concerned with display such robust and significant 
effects throughout the entire set of model alterations. Ethnically biased dyad and 
ethnic domination have consistently positive, significant effects across all models. 
Power ratio performs equally well. With regard to model fit, the consistent 
increase in pseudo-R2 indicates a general improvement of fit across the sequence 
of models. 
Having modelled the likelihood of intervention I turn to the question of the 
side of interventions. Recall that symmetrical dyads are hypothesised to 
experience interventions in favour of the government, whereas asymmetrical 
dyads are thought to see interventions in favour of the rebels. Some indication of 
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the effects of these variables is found in the following table analysis. Table 4.2 
displays the frequency distribution of dyad type on intervention side.10 A chi-
squared with p < 0.0005 indicates that there is significant correlation between  
 
Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of dyad type on intervention side, absolute and 
relative frequencies (%). 
 
 
Dyad type 
Intervention side 
Asymmetrical 
dyad 
Symmetrical 
dyad 
Ethnically 
neutral dyad 
 
N 
Rebels 24 (10) 11 (8) 15 (0.4) 50 
Government 8 (3) 7 (5) 13 (0.3) 28 
No intervention 209 (87) 123 (87) 3925 (99.3) 4257 
N 241 (100) 141 (100) 3953 (100) 4335 
 
Chi-squared (df = 4) = 315.530, p < 0.0005 
 
the variables in the table. The relative frequencies confirm the picture from Table 
4.1. Intervention on any side is overwhelmingly more likely to occur within an 
ethnically biased dyad – symmetrical or asymmetrical – than in an ethnically 
neutral dyad. For example, the proportion of symmetrical dyads with 
intervention in favour of the government is 5%, whereas the corresponding 
percentage for ethnically neutral dyads is a paltry 0.3. The relative frequencies 
also indicate that there is little difference between the effects of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical dyads on intervention side. These associations must be 
investigated more closely. 
Being as it is a three-by-three table, several changes in odds may be 
calculated, depending on which outcomes and baselines one is interested in. Let 
me illustrate with one example. The odds ratio of an asymmetrical dyad 
experiencing intervention in favour of the rebels with baselines ethnically 
neutral dyad and no intervention is ( ) ( ) 30.0515209/392524 =×× . Using the same 
                                                 
10 Note that the grand total, 4335, is one less than the total number of dyads in the data set, 4336. 
This is due to the exclusion of one dyad in which the intervention supported neither the 
government nor the rebels. Intervention side was recorded as a missing value.   
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baselines, the odds ratio of an asymmetrical dyad experiencing intervention in 
favour of the government is ( ) ( ) 11.5513209/39258 =×× . The greater odds ratio for 
intervention in favour of the rebels is indication that asymmetrical dyads are 
most likely to experience rebel-friendly interventions, exactly as hypothesised.  
The analysis of the side of interventions is further elaborated in Table 4.3, 
which reports the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logistic regression of  
 
Table 4.3: multinomial logistic regression estimates, probability of interventions 
in favour of government or rebels. 
 
 Model 8 Model 9 
 Intervention 
in favour of 
government 
Intervention 
in favour of 
rebels 
Test for 
21 ββ =  
Intervention 
in favour of 
government 
Intervention 
in favour of 
rebels 
Test for 
21 ββ =  
 2χ  2χ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  βˆ  
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)  (sig.) (sig.) 
Constant -5.710*** 
(0.368) 
-5.567*** 
(0.298) 
 -10.243** 
(4.418) 
-1.956 
(4.134) 
 
Symmetrical  
dyad 
2.844*** 
(0.498) 
3.153*** 
(0.451) 
0.170 
(0.676) 
2.665*** 
(0.864) 
1.860** 
(0.769) 
0.470 
(0.494) 
Asymmetrical  
dyad 
2.447*** 
(0.536) 
3.403*** 
(0.323) 
2.530 
(0.112) 
2.148*** 
(0.771) 
2.479*** 
(0.591) 
0.150 
(0.696) 
Ethnic 
domination  
in intervener 
   0.313 
(0.200) 
0.089 
(0.105) 
1.11 
(0.292) 
Joint borders    1.214* 
(0.641) 
1.800*** 
(0.579) 
0.580 
(0.446) 
ln Distance    -0.675** 
(0.318) 
-0.466** 
(0.191) 
0.390 
(0.530) 
ln Power ratio    0.744*** 
(0.130) 
0.587*** 
(0.149) 
0.710 
(0.400) 
ln GDPI    0.257 
(0.192) 
-0.082 
(0.164) 
2.100 
(0.147) 
Colonial  
history 
   0.813 
(0.745) 
1.174** 
(0.613) 
0.190 
(0.667) 
Cold War    0.948* 
(0.564) 
0.822 
(0.553) 
0.020 
(0.888) 
N 4335 3257 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-364.096 -182.820 
Pseudo-R2 0.176 0.375 
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil conflict). 
 
intervention side. Unlike binomial logistical regression, its multinomial sibling 
reports linear effects on the log odds of outcomes relative to a baseline outcome 
when the dependent variable is nominal and has more than two values. In this 
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case, the baseline is no intervention, so that the coefficient estimates indicate 
changes in the probability of either government-friendly intervention or rebel-
friendly intervention relative to no intervention occurring at all. Knowing the 
baseline, one may here, as with the binomial logistic regression, interpret  as 
the odds ratio of a one-unit increase in an explanatory variable, ceteris paribus.  
iβe
Model 8 then replicates the frequency table with dyad type disaggregated 
into two dummy variables with the common reference category ethnically neutral 
dyad. The model confirms my sampling of the frequency table. The positive 
association between any ethnically biased dyad and the probability of 
intervention is reiterated. With regard to the side of interventions, the odds ratio 
of an asymmetrical dyad having intervention in favour of the rebels, 
, precisely as calculated from the frequency table. Likewise, the odds 
ratio of an asymmetrical dyad experiencing government-friendly intervention, 
, is a replication of the tabulated association. In the third column of 
models 8 and 9 I test that using a Wald test with chi-squared distribution 
(Stata Manual 2003: 224). In model 8, only the coefficients of asymmetrical dyad 
can be claimed with some confidence (p = 0.112) to be different. Then one may 
infer that asymmetrical dyads are more likely to have interventions in favour of 
the rebels than in favour of the government, which gives conditional support to 
Hypothesis 3. The fact that the difference between the coefficients of symmetrical 
dyad is not significant (p = 0.676), and that the differences between coefficients 
within dyad types are not greater, either cripples the theory on intervention sides 
or indicates that there are limitations in the research design.  
30.053.403 =e
11.552.447 =e
21 ββ =
An examination of the measurement procedures suggests that the estimates 
in model 8 are inconclusive. The theory on dyad types relies on the assumption 
that ethnic groups with transnational affinities are involved in civil conflicts in 
ways that make them politically relevant for relations between T and I. The 
coding of dyad types, however, does not have procedures for ensuring that dyadic 
ethnic bias stems from ethnic groups that are parties to the civil conflict. Thus, 
the data does contain ethnically biased dyads such as the asymmetrical majority 
dyad TI Bosnia / Yugoslavia where the minority Serbs in Bosnia truly were part 
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of the civil conflict in which the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia intervened, but 
the data also contains dyads such as the asymmetrical majority dyad TI 
Cambodia / Vietnam where there was no ethnic dimension to the conflict and 
ideological cleavages cut across ethnic groups. As it stands, the coding procedures 
have forced such dyads into dyad types based on assumptions of inter-group 
dynamics that do not apply. The estimates in model 8 are most probably heavily 
influenced by this disassociation between theory and data. Hypothesis 3 on the 
effects of asymmetry is conditionally supported, but a conclusive test of the dyad 
typology awaits more valid data.  
Model 9 controls for the effects of possible confounding variables. It includes 
the variables tested in model 7 in Table 4.1 with the exception of conflict 
intensity and allied, none of which had significant effects. Overall, model 9 
confirms the findings in model 7. The likelihood of intervention on any side is a 
positive function of all variables with the exception of distance. However, once 
the differential effects of symmetrical dyad and asymmetrical dyad on the side of 
intervention are controlled for with the remaining variables, and with the recent 
discussion in mind, it is no surprise that the differences between the coefficient 
estimates of each variable no longer are significant. All chi-squared tests of 
coefficient equality return p-values ranging from 0.292 to 0.888. The model is not 
able to predict when third parties intervene in favour of the government and 
when they intervene in favour of the rebels. Yet, the estimates are as 
inconclusive as the data is tentative.    
Let that suffice for preliminary comments on the results. In the following 
chapter I will reflect in some more depth on the lessons that may be drawn from 
the statistical modelling, particularly with a focus on the ethnicity variables.  
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5 
DISCUSSION 
 
What do we now know? In minimalist terms, we know that interventions are 
more likely to occur when the same ethnic group resides in both the intervener 
and the target, we know that the probability of intervention is positively 
associated with the product of the relative size of the ethnic group in power in 
the potential intervener and its number of ethnic groups, we know that the 
probability of intervention is likewise positively associated with the ratio of 
capabilities between the intervener and the target, and we know that 
interventions are somewhat more likely to be in favour of the rebels when the 
ethnic group in power in one state is a non-governmental ethnic group in the 
other state. Those are the results in operational terms. In the discussion below I 
will first consider the central findings with some optimism about their relevance 
to my conception of transnational ethnic affinities, ethnic domination, battle 
ground effectiveness and majority-minority affective dynamics. Second, I will 
argue by contrasting this study to earlier quantitative work on ethnic affinities 
and interstate interaction, that the analytical framework developed prior to the 
empirical tests constitutes theoretical advancement. I will finally point out some 
limitations with regard to measurement and scope, suggesting that the soil is 
ripe for advances in data generation and theoretical-empirical specification.  
 
5.1          FINDINGS 
 
Ethnically biased dyads are more likely to experience interventions than 
ethnically neutral dyads, ceteris paribus. Once controlled for important 
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opportunity variables such as joint borders, distance, and power asymmetry, the 
results in Table 4.1 indicate that the odds of intervention occurring within 
ethnically biased dyads are ten times higher than the odds of intervention within 
ethnically neutral dyads. The effect is highly significant across the range of 
models. The expected utility function models this effect by suggesting that 
transnational ethnic affinities at once decrease the costs of intervention and 
increase the utility of intervention success, to the extent that non-material 
affinities have material and positive effects on states’ choice to intervene. This 
finding adds an important, but not wholly unanticipated (Regan 1998: 758) 
affective dimension to prior studies of the causes of interventions, including 
Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), Lemke & Regan (2004), and Aydin (2005). It also 
confirms the intuitions of theoretically inspirational but anecdotal work such as 
Heraclides (1990) and Cooper & Berdal (1993). More generally, the empirical 
results are supportive of analytically formative contributions such as Mitchell 
(1970) and Suhrke & Noble (1977). The findings add empirical legitimacy to their 
conceptual distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘affective’ linkages between 
groups in the civil conflict state and the potential intervener (Mitchell 1970: 184), 
and ‘affective’ versus ‘instrumental’ motivations for external involvement 
(Suhrke & Noble 1977: 10). Finally, the robust effect of transnational ethnic 
affinities lends support to those who argue for the significance of ethnic 
dynamics in international relations (for example Carment & James 1997; Davis 
et al. 1997; Ganguly 1998; Stack Jr. 1997).      
Ethnic domination in the potential intervener  is also shown to increase its 
propensity to intervene.  The finding provides supportive evidence for one of the 
central hypotheses in the qualitative work of Carment & James (1995, 2000). 
Empirical testing was warranted because they so explicitly address interventions 
motivated by ethnic affinities, and because they go to some length to 
theoretically specify the mechanisms by which such interventions come about. 
Though Carment & James (2000: 185-193) find evidence by the comparison of 
four cases that ethnically dominant states are more prone to irredentism and 
intervention, my statistical analysis suggests that their intuition holds for a 
much wider range of cases. Ethnically dominant states, to the extent that they 
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have large ethnic groups in power and are reasonably multiethnic, are more 
likely to intervene. The implicit positive association between number of ethnic 
groups and the likelihood of intervention also lends support to Suhrke & Noble’s 
(1977: 14) proposal that multiethnic states are more likely to intervene than 
others. 
Power asymmetry may not be an ethnicity variable, but it is of central 
concern here because its empirical treatment is a partial test of the fruitfulness 
of the formal model. The positive association between power asymmetry and the 
probability of intervention not only confirms expectations with regard to the 
opportunity and willingness to intervene, it also lends empirical support to the 
effort to formalise the process of choice. Recall that a central dimension in the 
weighing of the expected utility of non-intervention against the expected utility 
of intervention was a comparison of the estimated probability of government 
success without intervention with the estimated probability of government 
success with an intervention. The difference between p and q was formalised as a 
comparison of two contest success functions. It was demonstrated that the 
decisive variable was a composite measure of the potential intervener’s relative 
capabilities and its relative population size, operationally approximated by the 
ratio of CINC-scores. The positive effect of power asymmetry does suggest that 
potential interveners rate their chances of successful intervention as higher 
when they can devote relatively more resources to the campaign, precisely as the 
contest success functions posit. Thus, the finding suggests that there is indeed 
congruence between the formal model and state practice.   
The side of interventions is only partially predicted by dyad type, as they 
are operationalised. Hypothesis 3 about the tendency of asymmetrical dyads to 
have interventions in favour of the government receives conditional support, but 
the findings are inconclusive due to the imperfect fit between theory and data 
discussed in Chapter 4 and below. I emphasise, however, that this is not 
irredeemable damnation of the hypotheses on dyad symmetry and the side of 
interventions. Conclusive tests require better data.  
Aside from the empirical findings, this study constitutes theoretical 
advancement by comprehensively specifying the alternative configurations of 
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ethnicity and power that determine the mechanisms by which transnational 
ethnic relations and interstate behaviour are linked. Such theoretical 
advancement is probably best highlighted by contrasting it with other 
quantitative work on the effects of transnational ethnic affinities on interstate 
dynamics. The studies I have in mind are Davis et al.’s (1997) broad 
investigation of politicised communal groups’ effects on the conflict levels 
between states, Davis & Moore’s (1997) somewhat more specified investigation of 
the association between transnational ethnic alliances and dyadic conflict levels, 
and Saideman’s (2002) inquiry into the causes of external support for ethnic 
groups in conflict. The earlier quantitative work share similar theoretical 
limitations. Their focus is minorities at risk. As a consequence they exclude 
possible dyad types. Saideman (2002: 32n, 33n) limits his inquiry to 
disadvantaged groups and advantaged minorities with ethnic kin in power in 
neighbouring states, thus only studying asymmetrical majority dyads and some 
incarnation of the symmetrical majority dyad. Davis et al. (1997: 154) and Davis 
& Moore (1997: 175-176) move beyond the asymmetrical majority dyad by also 
defining and testing effects of the symmetrical minority dyad, but no other dyad 
types are considered. None of them follow the advantaged / disadvantaged or 
majority / minority dichotomies to their logical conclusion and specify a complete 
set of ethnically biased dyads. The robust effects of ethnically biased dyad in 
models 1 – 7 and symmetrical dyad and asymmetrical dyad in models 8 – 9 
suggest that the derivation of a saturated dyad typology has been fruitful. By 
way of characterisation, mine is a structural theory of ethnic groups in 
international relations, emphasising variation in access to power, foreign policy 
predominance, and resource endowment.  
The theoretical limitations in Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997) and 
Saideman (2002) should not mask operational strengths that expose one weak 
point in the association between theory and data in the present study. My 
research design has a somewhat imperfect fit between theory and the 
operationalisation of dyad types. By basing their selection of ethnic groups on 
Minorities at Risk, Davis et al. (1997: 152), Davis & Moore (1997: 172) and 
Saideman (2002: 33) ensure that they only study groups that are politically 
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salient. Whereas I develop a more comprehensive framework for analysis based 
on assumptions of political salience, my coding procedures at present do not 
ensure that the ethnic groups defining the various ethnically biased dyads are 
conflict parties or politically relevant to interstate relations. The Vietnamese in 
North and South Vietnam, for example, determine that the two are a 
symmetrical majority dyad, but the Vietnam War was not between ethnic 
groups. Neither the Vietnamese, Tay, Muong nor the Nung defined a conflict 
party.11 As indicated in the presentation of the results, the fit between 
assumptions of political salience and the data is left to chance, based on the 
simplifying assumption that ethnic groups in civil war states broadly are 
politically relevant. This disassociation is probably the cause of the non-
significant differences between coefficient estimates in the multinomial 
regression of intervention side. While my analytical framework deserves to be 
kept and refined for later application, the imperfect fit between theory and data 
must be rectified in future work.   
 
5.2          LIMITATIONS 
 
Limitations in measurements are not confined to the somewhat tentative 
operationalisation of dyad types. Although the broad-gauge measure of ethnically 
biased dyads as pairs of states with the same ethnic group may capture some 
important aspects of transnational ethnic affinities, such simplification does 
violence to important characteristics of ethnic groups that are worth bearing in 
mind when analysing the data: the non-monolithic character of ethnically 
denominated populations, and the temporal contingency of ethnic categories. The 
possibility of identity-based affinities between groups that are not regarded as 
ethnically alike is also excluded. Finally, the scope of the inquiry does not 
encompass geography, although its importance for the international political 
salience of ethnic groups requires investigation.   
 
                                                 
11 See the appendix. 
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The non-monolithic character of ethnic groups is at present ignored by a 
coding scheme that treats ethnic groups as if they are a uniform mass with a 
common will. The Kurdish population is a case in point. At present, dyads 
containing either two of Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria would receive a ‘1’ for ethnic 
bias, masking the extent to which the Kurds are a diverse population with 
diverging views on secessionist and irredentist movements. The Kurdish 
population is highly differentiated along religious, tribal, class, political and 
ideological lines, has different political-institutional experiences of national 
identity and citizenship, and different relations with transnational networks 
(Somer 2005: 116). Thus the Turkish Kurds were opposed to the 2003 American 
invasion of Iraq, while Iraqi Kurds supported it. (ibid.). In Turkey, the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict is primarily between the Turkish state and Kurdish 
nationalists, and has notable regional and socio-economic dimensions. Thus, 
surveys of the self-identification of Kurds consistently report a lower proportion 
than official estimates, many declare multiple identities, self-identification varies 
with time, region, class and ideology, and Kurdish identity is a significant 
determinant of political preferences only among the rural poor in the southeast 
and east (Somer 2005: 116-117).  
The intra-ethnic variation in the Kurdish population is probably not unique 
among transnationally dispersed ethnic groups, and worth bearing in mind as a 
qualifier of the findings regarding ethnically biased dyads. Regardless of 
variation within ethnic groups, however, elites may very well regard ethnic 
groups as if they were monolithic, genealogically determinate, and the primary 
source of identity (Somer 2005: 113). Then, the present coding scheme would 
suffice to express the politically relevant form of transnational ethnic 
communities to the extent that such elite perceptions predominate.  
The temporal and situational contingency of ethnic categories is likewise 
disregarded by the present measures (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 2; Kasfir 
1979: 365; Laitin & Posner 2001: 14-15; Smith 1986: 68). As Kasfir (1979: 365) 
argues, ethnic identity is fluid and intermittent, and ethnic loyalties compete 
with other loyalties as the foundation of political action, precisely as Somer 
(2005: 114) illustrates with the case of the Kurds. Thus Smith (1986: 68) 
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reiterates that ‘ethnic ties and sentiments fluctuate greatly in their salience and 
effects in different periods and areas’. Ethnic groups and ethnic fractionalisation 
change. They do so, suggest Laitin & Posner (2001: 14), as ‘people over 
generations assimilate, differentiate, amalgamate, break-apart, immigrate and 
emigrate.’  
Such fluidity in ethnic categories and the politicisation of dimensions of 
ethnicity should spawn some reservations about static measures of ethnic 
affinities. As with the operational monolithic assumptions, the question is also 
here how well the measure generally represents politically relevant ethnic 
categories within a limited temporal domain. The argument that conflicts may 
form and cement divisions along ethnic lines (Laitin & Posner 2001: 15; Somer 
2005: 117) would suggest that the study of interventions in civil wars using 
relatively static ethnic categories has some use.      
Identity-based transnational ethnic affinities between groups that are not 
nominally regarded as ethnically equal were a component of the theoretical 
definition presented in Chapter 1, but are not included in the operational 
definition. Thus, the measure of transnational ethnic affinities as populations 
from the same ethnic groups living in different countries, does not capture such 
politically salient ethnic affinities as those between American Jews and the 
Israelis, or those between African Americans and the South Sudanese. Such 
operational limitation is not unique to this study (Davis et al. 1997: 157; Davis & 
Moore 1997: 176; Saideman 2002: 37).  
The operational exclusion of identity-based transnational ethnic affinities 
has also spilt over into the assumptions underlying some of the theoretical 
framework. In particular, the deduction of causal mechanisms in the 
symmetrical minority dyad and the asymmetrical minority dyad are based on 
assumptions about secessions and irredentas that would not apply to minority 
support-groups in distant countries. One way in which to get around this is to 
specify that the operational definition of ethnic affinities applies to some sorts of 
dyad, whereas the wider concept of ethnic affinities applies to other sorts, in an 
effort to identify the antecedent conditions (van Evera 1997: 9-10) under which 
the posited causal processes work.  
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One could argue, for instance, that transnational ethnic affinity in the 
sense of equal ethnic identity applies to symmetrical minority and asymmetrical 
minority dyads where the countries are proximate, because of their potential for 
real or perceived irredentism. Ethnic affinities in the sense of empathy and 
sympathy for groups in foreign countries identified as being relevant by virtue of 
ethnic identification may only apply to symmetrical majority and asymmetrical 
majority dyads. Thus Israel and the United States may be considered a 
symmetrical majority dyad because the minority American Jews have access to 
and real influence on the people in power. Similarly, Sudan and the United 
States could be conceived of as an asymmetrical majority dyad in the sense that 
African American lobbyists may project their wishes for the South Sudanese on 
the groups in control of American foreign policy.  
Such musings disclose theoretical limitations and the need for better 
specification of conditions and causes. On an optimistic note, the analytical 
framework is by no means a lost cause. It may be embryonic, but it has the 
parsimony and flexibility needed for further refinement. Its present weakness 
displays its future potential.  
What about geography? While the non-monolithic character of ethnically 
denominated populations and the temporal and situational contingency of ethnic 
categories would suggest that a more flexible measure of ethnic affinities is 
desirable, the exclusion of geography is not so much a problem of measurement 
validity as it is a disregard of a perhaps decisive condition for ethnically 
motivated interventions.   
Consider Carment & James (1995: 95), who most generally, and in the 
context of irredentist campaigns, insist that ‘protagonists will be territorially 
adjacent; because few states can project military force across the globe, borders 
are integral to involvement and even serve as a defining characteristic of 
irredentist conflict.’ Further, Heraclides’ (1990) study of secessionist minorities 
suggests that the geographical location of ethnic groups has very particular 
effects on the side of intervention. He finds that states adjacent to government-
controlled territory in a neighbouring state tends to intervene in favour of the 
government, whereas states adjacent to mixed territory or purely secessionist-
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held territory tend to intervene in favour of the rebels (Heraclides 1990: 374). 
The salience of group-level geographical parameters is also recognised by 
Cederman & Girardin (2005: 10), particularly with regard to the logistical 
obstacles to conflict.  
The geographical and demographic arrangement of national populations is 
neither lost on van Evera (1994: 17) whose reasoning may be applied to the 
likelihood of third-party interventions in internal conflict with some deduction 
and adaptation. Van Evera (1994: 17) argues that ‘intermingling raises the risk 
of communal conflict during the struggle for national freedom, as groups that 
would be trapped as minorities in a new national state oppose its reach for 
freedom.’ Given that an internal conflict along communal lines has erupted, one 
may ask how variation in the demographic arrangement of national populations 
can be expected to influence the likelihood of intervention. Van Evera (1994: 19) 
indicates that the possibility of forcible rescue of a minority is an important 
demographic variable. It may be applied to third-party interventions in internal 
conflicts by expecting ‘possibility of forcible rescue’ to be determined by the 
geographical accessibility and the concentration of ethnic groups. Given that 
ethnic groups are relatively geographically concentrated, at least in some areas, 
one may expect the degree of contiguity between the ethnic concentration and 
the potential intervener to influence the likelihood of intervention. Ease of access 
reduces the costs of intervention.  
In short, geography matters (Buhaug & Rød 2005: 2, 20). A refined 
empirical inquiry into the incidence and sides of ethnically motivated 
interventions cannot remain aloof of geography and demography. While evidence 
suggests that the geographical disaggregation of population data may be useful 
in order to understand the onset of civil war, there is recognition that measures 
of local ethnic composition must be improved (Buhaug & Rød 2005: 20). Sub-
national geographical and demographic data on ethnic groups must also be 
applicable to empirical treatment of the international relations of civil wars.  
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6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This inquiry is at an end. I conclude it by looking back and projecting forward. I 
first summarise the central advances and findings. I then offer five concrete 
proposals for the refinement of further research.  
The study set out on the premise that earlier work on third-party 
interventions in civil conflicts has left space for the quantitative treatment of 
affective dimensions of interventions, and that existing work on the international 
relations of transnational ethnic affinities needs better theoretical specification. 
With that in mind, I posed three questions. Do transnational ethnic affinities 
increase the probability of interventions? Does the relative predominance of one 
ethnic group in potential interveners turn them into actual interveners? May 
variation in the configuration of ethnic groups and power explain which side 
interventions favour? I derived hypotheses proposing affirmative answers to 
these questions, as well as one hypothesis on the association between the 
potential intervener’s power predominance and the likelihood that it intervene.   
Expected utility functions were developed in order to integrate 
transnational ethnic affinities in a formal model of the choice to intervene. 
Contest success functions (CSF) were included in the expected utility framework 
in order to model the potential intervener’s estimation of the probability of 
success for the government in the civil war country. The CSFs apply to three 
contingencies - non-intervention, intervention in favour of the government, or 
intervention in favour of the rebels. Potential interveners are thought to choose 
the option with the greatest expected utility. Aside from having the apparent 
advantage of giving the theoretical arguments a structure and language of costs 
and utilities, the formal model also receives some empirical support. The positive 
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effect of the potential intervener’s relative capabilities on the probability of 
intervention does suggest that the contest success function captures a central 
dimension of the choice to intervene. 
Subsequent to the formal model, I developed a typology of interstate dyads 
with transnational ethnic affinities, from which the hypotheses on the occurrence 
of interventions and side of interventions were derived. It may be argued that the 
dyad typology constitutes theoretical advancement for the study of the 
international relations of transnational ethnic affinities. By specifying the 
alternative configurations of ethnic groups and power within interstate dyads, 
given that transnational ethnic affinities exist, I define a comprehensive set of 
structural conditions that may determine the dynamics of the domestic and 
international politics of ethnic affinities. The analytical framework is structural 
because it regards ethnic groups as relatively unitary actors, and because it 
emphasises access to or control of state power, and the resource endowment of 
adversarial parties. Its theoretical parsimony leaves it vulnerable to criticism 
based on confounding cases, yet gives it flexibility for further refinement and 
better specification.  
The hypotheses were tested on cross-sectional data on civil conflicts and 
interventions within North Africa, Europe, and Asia in the period 1944-1994. The 
unit of analysis is the conflict dyad, that is, each civil war country is paired with 
every member of the international system at the time of the conflict. The 
empirical tests generated the following findings.  
Much like the expected utility functions anticipated the effects of ethnic 
affinities by assigning them a separate term in the cost and utility equations, a 
robust and positive association between ethnically biased dyads and the 
likelihood of intervention indicates that ethnic affinities are – as it was put – an 
amplifying factor, also when duly controlled for contiguity and distance. As the 
expected utility function modelled it, transnational ethnic affinities at once lower 
the costs of intervention and raise the utility of favourable intervention 
outcomes, in short making interventions more likely.  
The probability of intervention is also influenced by the monadic ethnic 
characteristics of the potential intervener. It would seem that states in which the 
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ethnic group in power predominates in domestic politics, particularly when they 
are ethnically diverse, are more likely to intervene than states with greater 
pluralism in domestic politics. Ethnically dominant states are less prone to settle 
ethnic issues cooperatively, and their governments have less to loose and more to 
gain from pursuing ethnic foreign policies.  
Finally, the slight empirical suggestion that interveners are more likely to 
favour the rebels in the civil war state than its government when they are in 
dyads where an ethnic group in power has affinity with a non-governmental 
ethnic group, lends some support to the effort to explain intervention side as a 
result of the differential dynamics of dyad type. In light of the theoretical 
possibilities and operational limitations discussed in the previous chapter, the 
evidence is at least encouragement that the dyad typology ought to be further 
developed and operationally improved.  
Improvement, both operational and theoretical, is the concern of this final 
section of the conclusion. I offer five proposals. First, the analytical framework 
ought to be evolved by better specifying the dynamics of the various dyad types. 
Particular attention should be given to enunciating the domains of application of 
the different aspects of ethnic affinities. Focus should be on the antecedent 
conditions (van Evera 1997: 9-10) or the environment (Stinchcombe 1968: 31) of 
causal processes.  
Second, the dyad typology must be operationalised and measured in terms 
that ensure the political relevance of the defining transnational ethnic groups. 
Thus one retains the theoretical advantages of the dyad typology, while 
importing the operational strength from other quantitative work on the 
international relations of transnational ethnic affinities. 
Third, given that ethnic categories are temporally contingent, and ethnic 
groups may gain or lose power, one should give serious thought to collecting time-
series data on characteristics of ethnic groups. There is recognition of this 
challenge in, for example, Cederman & Girardin (2005), where ethnic groups in 
power are coded for temporal ambiguity. By collecting time-series data, those 
ambiguities may be removed, and the snap-shot image of ethnic groups provided 
by Fearon (2003) nuanced by accounting for time.  
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Fourth, the operationalisation of transnational ethnic affinities ought to 
have the means to capture identity-based ethnic affinities between groups that 
are not nominally recognised as being ethnically alike. Such operational 
improvement must be theoretically coordinated with developments in the dyad 
typology.  
Finally, geography and demography must be accounted for. Relevant 
parameters would include the geographical location of ethnic groups, the 
geographical accessibility of ethnic groups for potential interveners, and the 
relative concentration and dispersion of ethnic groups.  
Whereas some steps have been taken towards answering the research 
questions of this inquiry, much work, as always, remains. Some of that effort 
could have been included within the perimeters of this thesis, while other tasks 
necessitate new and otherwise framed projects.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
CATEGORISING AMBIGUOUS ETHNICALLY BIASED DYADS 
 
 
Dyad: TI Internal 
conflicts 
Alternative 
ethnic 
groups 
creating 
ethnic bias 
Choice of 
dyad type 
(decisive ethnic 
group) 
Argument 
Syria’s irredentism is 
primarily pan-Arab 
(Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 
1997: 56).  
Lebanon / 
Syria 
1958-1958 
1975-1988 
1988-1990 
Sunni-Arabs 
Shi’is / Alawi
Maronite / 
Christians 
Druze 
Asymmetrical 
majority 
 
(Sunni-Arab) 
The Kurdish issue has been 
most significant in Turkey’s 
dealings with Iraq. The 
Kurdish territories have their 
largest reach within Turkey, 
and, in Turkey’s eyes, a history 
of secessionism. All wars since 
1961 were wars with a Kurdish 
secessionist content (Fisher 
2003: 447, 449; Tripp 1989: 
68).  
Iraq / 
Turkey 
1956-1959 
1961-1966 
1974-1974 
1985-1993 
1991-
ongoing 
Kurds 
Arabs 
Symmetrical 
minority 
 
(Kurds) 
Sunni-Arab relations are 
considered to be the most 
important. Iraq has a history 
of successful appeal to Syrian 
Sunnis disillusioned with the 
Alawi. Many Syrians saw the 
Sunni, Baathist Iraq as a 
natural partner (Ehteshami & 
Hinnebusch 1997: 97-98). 
Iraq / 
Syria 
1956-1959 
1961-1966 
1974-1974 
1985-1993 
1991-
ongoing 
Kurds 
Sunni-Arabs 
Symmetrical 
majority 
 
(Sunni-Arabs) 
The centrality of an Islamic 
heritage in Arab nationalism 
(Choueiri 2000: 164) and the 
predominance of pan-Arabism 
in inter-Arab relations in a 
primarily Sunni-Muslim region 
(Choueiri 2000: 166-167), 
would suggest that the Sunni-
Muslims, if any, are most 
relevant to Iraqi-Lebanese 
relations.  
Iraq / 
Lebanon 
1956-1959 
1961-1966 
1974-1974 
1985-1993 
1991-
ongoing 
Sunni-
Muslims 
Shi’is 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Sunni-
Muslims) 
Iraq / 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1956-1959 
1961-1966 
1974-1974 
1985-1993 
1991-
ongoing 
Sunni-Arabs 
Shi’is 
Symmetrical 
majority 
 
(Sunni-Arabs) 
 
As above. 
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Iraq / 
Iran 
1956-1959 
1961-1966 
1974-1974 
1985-1993 
1991-
ongoing 
Shi’is 
Arabs 
Kurds 
Asymmetrical 
majority in 
1956-1959 
1985-1993 
1991-ongoing  
 
(Shi’is) 
 
Symmetrical 
minority in  
1961-1966 
1974-1974  
(Kurds) 
The wars in which the Shi’is are 
considered most significant were 
not specifically or solely Kurdish 
secessionist. 1985-1993 began 
during the Iran-Iraq war which 
was revolutionary (Chubin 
1989: 13; Karsh 1989: 1). The 
Shi’i rebellion after 1991 is 
assumed to have been most 
important with respect to Iran. 
The Kurdish issue predominates 
in the wars of 1961-1966 and 
1974-1974, which specifically 
were for Kurdish secession 
(Fisher 2003: 447, 449). 
Domestic politics were of minor 
importance in Irani-Syrian 
relations in this period 
(Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997: 
88). The choice of the Shi’is / 
Alawi is based on the 
recognition that the Alawi had 
some representation in the 
Syrian regime (ibid.: 98), and 
that there was some connection 
between the Alawi and Shi’ism 
(ibid.: 98-99). Hence, a 
symmetrical majority dyad.  
Iran / 
Syria 
1978-1979 
1981-1982 
Shi’is / Alawi
Arabs 
Kurds 
 
Symmetrical 
majority 
 
(Shi’is / Alawis) 
Given that the Iranian 
revolution was for export 
(Chubin 1989: 13), the Shi’is are 
assumed to be most important 
for relations between Iran and 
Iraq.  
Iran / 
Iraq 
1978-1979 
1981-1982 
Shi’is 
Arabs 
Kurds 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Shi’is) 
Iran attempted to export its 
revolution to Saudi Arabia 
(Fürtig 2002: 24). In that 
context the Sunni-Shi’i cleavage 
is not so important. However, 
given that the Shi’is were 
generally more anti-royalist and 
anti-imperialist, the Shi’is, if 
any, are assumed to 
predominate. Therefore an 
asymmetrical minority dyad.  
Iran / 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1978-1979 
1981-1982 
Shi’is 
Sunni-Arabs 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Shi’is) 
Dyads 
involving 
Morocco / 
Algeria / 
Tunisia / 
Libya 
n/a Arabs 
Berbers 
Symmetrical 
majority 
 
(Arabs) 
Pan-Arabism is assumed to be 
the dominant mode in inter-
Arab relations, including the 
countries of North Africa 
(Choueiri 2000: 166-169).  
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Yugoslavia / 
Austria 
1991-1992 Yugoslavs / 
Serbs 
Croats 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Yugoslavs / 
Serbs) 
Assuming that Croatia was 
independent from its 
declaration in June 1991 
(Holbrooke 1998: 27), the 
Croats fall away by the 
diaspora rule (see p. 50 above). 
The Hungarians of Vojvodina 
were the main factor in 
Yugoslav-Hungarian relations 
(Allcock et al. 1998: 117; Péter 
2003: 313; Ramet 2002: 167).  
Yugoslavia / 
Hungary 
1991-1992 Hungarians 
Serbs 
Asymmetrical 
majority 
 
(Hungarians) 
The Bengali are assumed to be 
most important in Indian-
Bangladeshi relations. India 
sheltered, trained, armed, and 
supported Bengali guerrilla 
forces along and across the 
frontier (Taylor 2003b: 153). 
Also, the Bengali government 
in exile was sheltered in India 
prior to Bangladeshi 
independence (Taylor 2003a: 
88).  
Bangladesh/ 
India 
1971-
ongoing 
Bengali 
Hindus 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Bengali) 
Cambodia / 
N. Vietnam 
or Vietnam 
1970-1975 
1979-1991 
Khmer 
Vietnamese 
Asymmetrical 
majority 
 
(Vietnamese) 
A difficult choice given that it 
is hard to find an ethnic 
dimension to this conflict. 
Either way the dyad will be 
asymmetrical. I land on the 
Vietnamese because the 
Khmer in Vietnam are not 
much referred to (Summers 
2003: 127-128). 
 
No ethnic dimension of this 
conflict is mentioned (Smith 
2003: 1123-1124). It is coded as 
ideological by Regan (1996: 
354). Hence I choose the 
majority Vietnamese.  
S. Vietnam / 
N. Vietnam 
1960-1965 Vietnamese 
Tay 
Muong 
Nung 
Symmetrical 
majority 
 
(Vietnamese) 
S. Vietnam / 
Cambodia 
1960-1965 Vietnamese 
Khmer 
Asymmetrical 
minority 
 
(Vietnamese) 
The Khmer in Vietnam are not 
really mentioned (Summers 
2003: 127). On border issues 
reaching within Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese are in focus (ibid.). 
I therefore let the Vietnamese 
determine the dyad type. Note 
that this is an ideological, not 
an ethnic conflict.  
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